Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1996

State of Utah v. David Castle : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Bradley P. Rich; Hakeem Ishola; Yengich, Rich & Xaiz; Attorneys for Appellant.
Jan Graham; Utah Attorney General; J Frederic Voros; Assistant Attorney General; Attorneys for
Appellee.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, State of Utah v. David Castle, No. 960755 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1996).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/541

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

9fc.Cn55- CAIN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

APPELLANT'S
OPENING BRIEF

vs.

Priority No. 2

DAVID CASTLE,

Lower Court No. 9417-250
Ct. App. No. 960755-CA

Defendant/Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE REFUSAL TO GRANT DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
DISMISS AND SUBSEQUENT JUDGMENT AND CONVICTION FOR
FAILURE TO STOP AT THE COMMAND OF A PEACE OFFICER, A
THIRD DEGREE FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN.
§41-6-13.5, AND NUMEROUS MISDEMEANORS, IN THE SEVENTH
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF
UTAH, THE HONORABLE SCOTT N. JOHANSEN, JUDGE PRESIDING.
BRADLEY P. RICH #2730
HAKEEM ISHOLA #5970
YENGICH, RICH & XAIZ
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
175 East 400 South, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 355-0320
JANET C. GRAHAM
Utah Attorney General
J. FREDERIC VOROS, JR.
Assistant Attorney General
Section Chief, Criminal Appeals
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee
P.O. Box 140854
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84114-0854

COURT OF M

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

)
)

APPELLANT'S
OPENING BRIEF

vs.

)

Priority No. 2

(Lower Court No. 9417-250

DAVID CASTLE,

) Ct. App. No. 960755-CA

Defendant/Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE REFUSAL TO GRANT DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
DISMISS AND SUBSEQUENT JUDGMENT AND CONVICTION FOR
FAILURE TO STOP AT THE COMMAND OF A PEACE OFFICER, A
THIRD DEGREE FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN.
§41-6-13.5, AND NUMEROUS MISDEMEANORS, IN THE SEVENTH
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF
UTAH, THE HONORABLE SCOTT N. JOHANSEN, JUDGE PRESIDING.
BRADLEY P. RICH #273 0
HAKEEM ISHOLA #5970
YENGICH, RICH & XAIZ
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
175 East 400 South, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 355-0320
JANET C. GRAHAM
Utah Attorney General
J. FREDERIC VOROS, JR.
Assistant Attorney General
Section Chief, Criminal Appeals
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854

List of Parties in the Court Below
The following is a complete list of the parties in the
proceedings before the Seventh Judicial District Court:
JUDGES
The Honorable Lyle R. Anderson, Judge Presiding (first trial);
The Honorable Scott N. Johansen, Judge Presiding (second trial);
PARTIES
The State of Utah, represented by Craig C. Hall, San Juan County
Attorney;
David E. Castle, defendant, represented himself pro se at trial;
represented thereafter at sentencing by Rose Reilly, Esq., and
Bradley P. Rich, Esq.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF PARTIES IN THE COURT BELOW

....

second to cover page

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

iii

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES

iv

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

1

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

2

RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.
B.
C.
D.

....

3
3

Nature of the Case
Course of Proceedings
Disposition in Trial Court
Statement of the Facts

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

8

ARGUMENT

9

POINT I

CASTLE WAS CONSTITUTIONALLY PLACED
IN JEOPARDY WHEN THE FIRST TRIAL
COURT SUA SPONTE DISCHARGED THE
JURY AND DECLARED A MISTRIAL
BECAUSE THE COURT WAS DISPLEASED
WITH THE MANNER IN WHICH CASTLE
CONDUCTED CROSS-EXAMINATION.
ACCORDINGLY, HE SHOULD NOT HAVE
BEEN SUBJECTED TO A SECOND TRIAL
FOR THE SAME OFFENSES

9

CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT

17

REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT

18

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

19

i

CONTENTS OF ADDENDA
I

FTNiHN'lS, J U D G M E N T ANli COMM I'T'MKN'l ORDF.F

i

i

i i )

RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
III

RULING ON MOTION TO DISMISS (R. 181)
VERDICT (R. 334)

V

ORDER OF CONTEMPT (R. 166)
DISTRICT COURT DOCKET SHEET
XCERPTS OF TRIAL TRANSCRIPT (R.

VIII RELEASE ORDER (R. 169)

ii

=y ^c3)

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Abney

v. United

States,

431 U.S. 651,

97 S. Ct. 2034 (1977)
Department

of Revenue

v. Kurth

10
Ranch,

511 U.S. 767, 770, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1945 (1994)
State

v. Ambrose,

State v. Arbon,

9

598 P. 2d 354 (Utah 1979)

passim

909 P.2d 1270 (Utah Ct. App.),

cert, denied,

916 P.2d 909 (Utah 1996)

.2

State v. Byrns,

911 P. 2d 981 (Utah Ct. App. 1995)

State

903 P.2d 940 (Utah Ct. App.),

v. Davis,

cert, granted,
State v. Hamilton,
State v. Miller,

10

916 P. 2d 909 (Utah 1996)

2, 9

827 P. 2d 232 (Utah 1992)

2

747 P. 2d 440 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)

State v. Musselman,
State v. Nilson,

9

667 P. 2d 1061 (Utah 1983)

10

854 P.2d 1029 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)10, 12, 14, 18

State v. Pearson,

818 P.2d 581 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) . . .

State v. Ramirez,

817 P. 2d 774 (Utah 1991)

State v. Reed,

53 Kan. 767, 37 P. 174 (1894)

State v. Thompson,
State v. Thurman,
State v. Trafny,
State v. Whitman,

199 P. 161 (1921)
846 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1993)
799 P. 2d 704 (Utah 1990)
74 P. 2d 696 (1973)

iii

10, 11
2

. . . .

13, 14, 17
10
2
9
passim

United

States
109 S .

v.
Ct.

Halper,
1892

490 U . S . 4 3 5 ,

(1989)

9

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Page
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
Amendment V

3,9

Amendment XIV

3

UTAH CONSTITUTION
Article 1, Section 12

3, 9

UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
§ 41-6-13.5

1, 3

§ 41-6-46

1, 3

§ 53-3-227

1, 3

§ 76-1-403

passim

§ 76-8-305

1, 3

§ 76-8-309

1, 3

§ 76-10-504(1) (a)

2, 3

§ 78-2a-3(2) (e)

2

§ 78-32-3

15

UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE
Rule 3 (a)

7

iv

BRADLEY P. RICH #2730
HAKEEM ISHOLA #5970
YENGICH, RICH & XAIZ
Attorneys for Appellant
175 East 400 South, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 355-0320
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

]
1
)1

APPELLANT'S
OPENING BRIEF

vs.

]>

Priority No. 2

DAVID CASTLE,

)

Lower Court No. 9417-250

)

Ct. App. No. 960755-CA

Defendant/Appellant.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction for
Count I: Failure to Stop at the Command of a Peace Officer, a third
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-13.5 (1994);
Count II: Speeding, a Class C misdemeanor, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 41-6-46 (1994); Count III: Interference With a Peace
Officer Making a Lawful Arrest, a Class B misdemeanor, in violation
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305 (1994); Count IV: Escape, a Class B
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-309

(1994) ;

Count V: Driving While on Suspension or Revocation in Another
State, a Class C misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 533-227 (1994); and Count VI: Carrying a Concealed Weapon, a Class B

misdemeanor,

in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-504 (1) (a)

(1994) .
This Court obtains statutory jurisdiction pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (e) (1996).
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Was Castle placed in constitutional jeopardy when the

first trial court sua

sponte

dismissed the jury and declared a

mistrial because the court was displeased with the manner Castle,
who was proceeding pro
A.

se, conducted cross-examination?

Standard of Appellate Review

This Court is reviewing the correctness of the trial court's
denial of Castle's motion to dismiss or motion to arrest judgment,
premised on the ground that he was placed in jeopardy after the
trial court essentially acquitted him by dismissing the jury and
declaring a mistrial.

Thus, the issue presented raises a question

of law and the trial court's decision is reviewed non-deferentially
for correction of error.

See State

72 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied,

v. Arbon,

909 P. 2d 1270, 1271-

916 P.2d 909 (Utah 1996);

State

v. Davis,

903 P. 2d 940, 942-43 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, granted,

916

P.2d 909

(Utah 1996).

See generally

State

v.

Thurman,

846 P.2d

1256, 1271 (Utah 1993) (question of law reviewed for correctness);
State

v. Hamilton,

827 P.2d 232, 238 (Utah 1992); State

817 P.2d 774, 781-82 & .3 (Utah 1991).
2

v.

Ramirez,

B.

Preservation of Issue and Propriety of Review

The issue was properly preserved in the court below.
Castle's pro

se Motion to Dismiss, R. 172, 220.

See also

See

Motion in

Arrest of Judgment and accompanying memorandum of law. R. 351-358.
The trial court denied both motions forming the basis of this
appeal.

See R. 181, 241, 369; see

also

Addendum III.

RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The relevant constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules
cited below here are reproduced verbatim at Addendum II:
United

States

Constitution,

Amendment

V;

United

States

Constitution, Amendment XIV; Utah Constitution, Article 1, Section
12; Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-6-13.5, 41-6-46, 53-3-227, 76-1-403, 76-8305, 76-8-309, 76-10-504.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of

the

Case

Castle was charged in a Six-Count Information filed September
26, 1994, alleging various violation of the Utah Criminal and
Traffic Codes (R.l-2). Castle thereafter filed various motions pro
se, including a Motion to Dismiss Count 5, Driving on Suspension
(R.24-48), and

judicial notice demand for rights (R.67-68).

3

B.

Course of

Proceedings

The district court denied all the motions (See, e.g.,

R.438).

Castle then underwent a jury trial before the Honorable Lyle R.
Anderson on July 17, 1995 (R.153, 431).
At trial, Castle apparently became acrimonious with the court
and counsel. The Court found Castle in contempt, excused the jury,
and declared a mistrial (R.166; see also

Addenda V & VII) . It then

ordered Castle* sent forthwith to jail

(R.166, 522; Addendum V) .

Castle filed an objection, and the matter was then set for retrial
over Castle's objection (R.172).
C.

Disposition

in Trial Court
absentia

before the

Honorable Scott N. Johansen, on March 20, 1996.

He was found

Castle

was subsequently

guilty as charged

retried

in

(R.334; Addendum IV).

Thereafter, the court

sentenced Castle to serve zero to five (0-5) years in prison on
Count I.

This sentence was stayed providing Castle serve six

months in the San Juan County Jail and pay a fine of $ 1250 (R.369,
43 0; see also
D.

Addendum I ) .

Statement of the Facts
On September 26, 1994, Sergeant Douglas B. Hall of the Utah

Highway Patrol, came into contact with Castle on Highway 191 in Dry
Valley, San Juan County, Utah (R.4 87).

Sergeant Hall observed the

car that Castle was driving and obtained a radar reading of his
4

traveling speed at 68 mph, which apparently was over the speed
limit for the area (R.488) . Sergeant Hall then pulled Castle over
for the driving violation.

Castle pulled over in response, but

refused to provide his driver's
Castle

notified

Sergeant

Hall

license.
that

he

Shortly thereafter,
had

a

weapon

in

his

possession, but refused to turn it over to the officer (R.492-93) .
Castle also revealed that he had a warrant out for his arrest on a
separate traffic matter (R.491).

Castle refused to get out of the

vehicle and left the scene, proceeding down the roadway towards
Monticello

(R.494).

A roadblock was subsequently commenced, and

Castle was apprehended and taken into custody (R.4 94-95)
The

State

then

charged

Castle

with

various

traffic

and

criminal charges in a six-count Information alleging, among others,
failure to yield to a police officer's command to stop, a third
degree felony (R.l-2).

Castle attempted to have counsel of his own

choosing, who, according to the record, appears not to have been a
member of the Utah State Bar (Addendum VI, at 5 [docket sheet]).
He also asked to have his own court reporter, who was apparently
not appropriately certified in the State of Utah
court denied both requests
After

denying

Castle's

(R.438) .

The

{id,).
pro

se

pretrial

Anderson impanelled a jury for trial (R.435-467).

motions,

Judge

Castle presented

an opening statement on his own behalf and attempted to raise
5

constitutional issues. He was admonished by the court (R.481-482).
During the course of that colloquy, Castle referred to the district
judge by his given name (R.482) . The court, once again, admonished
Castle and told him that his opening statement was over, ordering
Castle to sit down (R.486).
The State then called its first witness, Sergeant Hall, who
was examined by both parties (R.487, 510) . During the course of the
cross-examination, the State interposed numerous objections, which
were sustained by the court.

A discussion subsequently ensued

between the Court and Castle over the latitude of his crossexamination.

Eventually, the Court found Castle in contempt of

court and, in the presence of the jury, summarily sentenced him to
thirty (30) days in jail (R.522; Addenda V & VII).
then excused and a mistrial sua

sponte

The jury was

declared (R.522; Addendum

VII) .
Thereafter, Castle filed a Motion to Dismiss based on having
been placed in jeopardy as a result of the aborted trial (R.172).
The court denied the motion (R.169-70; Addendum III) . An order of
contempt was signed by the court on July 20, 1995

(R.166-67),

finding Castle in contempt for statements made during his opening
statement

and

for

ignoring

instructions

Addendum V.

6

from

the

court.

See

Castle later attempted to appeal the matter to this Court
(R.243). However, this Court issued an order of dismissal and a
remittitur

(R. 274-75), on the ground that there was not a final

appealable order under Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 3(a)
(Ru 275)- 1
The matter went back to the court below, and was set for a new
trial before the Honorable Scott Johansen (R.265, 276). This time,
Castle did not appear for trial
absentia,

(R.527), and was convicted

as charged in the Information

(R.334, 614; see

in
also

Addendum IV).
Subsequently, Castle hired present counsel, who filed a motion
in arrest of judgement, and again raised the double jeopardy issue
(R.351).

The motion was denied, and Castle was sentenced to serve

zero to five
except

(0-5) years in prison, all of which was suspended

for six (6) months incarceration in the San Juan County

Jail (R.369-70; Addendum I ) .
A notice of appeal was thereafter timely filed with the court
below

(R.374).

There are no prior or related appeals in this

matter other than the pro se

appeal filed by Castle, which was

dismissed on this Court's own motion as not being an appealable
final order (R.275).
1

But see State
v. Ambrose,
598 P.2d 354, 357 (Utah 1979)
(denial of defendant's motion to dismiss on double jeopardy
grounds is final appealable order).
7

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The district court committed reversible error for denying
Castle's
judgment.

pro

se

motion

to

dismiss

and

his

motion

to

arrest

Jeopardy clearly attached at the first trial when Judge

Anderson dismissed the jury and sua

sponte

declared a mistrial

because the court was displeased with Castle's cross-examination
manner.

No legal necessity justified the mistrial, particularly

when the court provided the parties no reasonable opportunity to
address whether mistrial was manifestly necessary, nor made on-therecord findings to justify the mistrial. Rather than declaring a
mistrial, the court could have warned Castle that his conduct could
invite a mistrial and subject him to another trial on the same
charges.
Accordingly, Judge Anderson's decision to declare a mistrial
was unnecessary and operated as an acquittal, precluding the State
from retrying Castle for the same offense before Judge Johansen.
Therefore Judge Anderson should have granted Castle's pnro se motion
to dismiss.

In the alternative, Judge Johansen should have granted

the same motion or the motion to arrest judgment.

8

ARGUMENT
POINT I
CASTLE WAS CONSTITUTIONALLY PLACED IN JEOPARDY WHEN THE
FIRST TRIAL COURT SUA SPONTE DISCHARGED THE JURY AND
DECLARED A MISTRIAL BECAUSE THE COURT WAS DISPLEASED WITH
THE MANNER IN WHICH CASTLE CONDUCTED CROSS-EXAMINATION.
ACCORDINGLY, HE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SUBJECTED TO A
SECOND TRIAL FOR THE SAME OFFENSES.
The Double Jeopardy Clause provisions in the Federal and Utah
Constitutions2

protect
u

overreaching:
acquittal;

a

against

three

types

of

government

a second prosecution for the same offense after

second

prosecution

for

the

same

offense

after

conviction; and multiple punishments for the same offense."
States

v.

See also

Halper,
Department

490 U.S. 435, 440, 109 S. Ct. 1892, 1897 (1989).
of

114 S. Ct. 1937, 1945
Miller,

United

Revenue

v. Kurth

(1994); Davis,

Ranch,

511 U.S. 767, 770,

903 P.2d at 943; State

747 P.2d 440, 444 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).

v.

It is the first

prohibition that is implicated here.

2

The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides "... nor shall any person be subject for the same
offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb..." U.S.
Const. Amend. V. Article 1, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution
similarly provides ".... nor shall any person be twice put in
jeopardy for the same offense." Utah Const, art. I, § 12. The
Utah Supreme Court has held that the similarity in the two
provisions does not necessarily require similar analysis. See
State v. Trafny,
799 P.2d 704, 709 n.18 (Utah 1990). However,
the federal standard remains persuasive. See id.
But
see
generally
State
v. Ambrose,
598 P.2d 354, 357 (Utah 1979)
(applying both state and federal standards without distinction).
9

In

Ambrose,

the

Utah

Supreme

Court

noted

that

" [t] he

guarantees assures that, with certain exceptions, an individual
will not be forced to endure the strain, embarrassment, anxiety and
expense

of

a

[second]

Ambrose,

598 P.2d at 357 (citing Abney

651, 97 S.Ct. 2034

criminal

trial

for

the

v. United

same
States,

According to Ambrose,

(1977)).

offense."
431 U.S.
"jeopardy

attaches when the accused is put on trial in a court of competent
jurisdiction, on a valid indictment (or information),
has been sworn and impaneled."
State

vs.

Whitman,

Ambrose,

and a jury

598 P.2d at 358 (citing

74 P.2d 696 (1973); and State vs. Thompson,

199

P. 161 (1921)) . 3
Under manifestly necessary circumstances, even when jeopardy
has attached,

the court may terminate a trial without implicating

the defendant's double

jeopardy protections, such as when the

defendant consents to discharging the jury or "legal necessity"
requires the discharge.

See

Whitman,

74 P.2d at 697; Ambrose,

598

P. 2d at 358 ("legal necessity" implies that "the court must refrain
from prematurely discharging the jury unless it determines, after
careful inquiry, that discharging the jury is the only reasonable
alternative to insure justice under the circumstances."); State

3

Accord State
v. Musselman,
667 P.2d 1061, 1065 (Utah
1983); State v. Byrns,
911 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah Ct. App. 1995);
State v. Nilson,
854 P.2d 1029, 1031 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
10

v.

Pearson,

818

P.2d

581, 584

example, in Whitman,

(Utah Ct. App.

1991)

(same).

For

the Utah Supreme Court held:

The court cannot arbitrarily discharge a jury,
nor should it ever be discharged until it
appears from the statements of the jurors, and
the facts and circumstances of a the case,
that every reasonable hope of agreement on a
verdict has vanished;
unless there is a
breakdown in the judicial machinery which
renders
further
orderly
and
systematic
procedure impracticable, such as the illness
of the court, or a juror, or the defendant, or
in some cases counsel; or reasons which the
law will recognize as an absolute necessity,
or
upon
grounds
provided
by
statute.

Otherwise,
acquittal.
Whitman,

the

discharge

74 P.2d at 697 (emphasis

P.2d at 359; Pearson,

operates
supplied);

as
accord

an
Ambrose,

598

818 P.2d at 584.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-403

(1994) also codifies the double

jeopardy guarantees, providing in pertinent parts, with emphasis
added:
(1) If a defendant has been prosecuted for one or more
offenses arising out of a single criminal episode, a
subsequent prosecution for the same or a different
offense arising out of the same criminal episode is
barred if:

(b)

The former prosecution:

(iii)

was improperly terminated[.]

11

(4) There is an improper termination of prosecution if
the termination takes place before the verdict, is for
reasons not amounting to an acquittal, and takes place
after a jury has been impanelled and sworn to try the
defendant, or, if the jury is waived, after the first
witness is sworn. However, termination of prosecution is
not improper if:
(a)

The defendant consents to the termination[.]

(c) The court finds and states for the record
termination
is necessary
because:

In Whitman,

that

the

(i)

It is physically impossible to proceed
with the trial in conformity with the
law; or

(ii)

There is a legal defect in the proceeding
not attributable to the state that would
make any judgment entered upon a verdict
reversible as a matter of law; or

(iii)

Prejudicial conduct in or out of the
courtroom not attributable to the state
makes it impossible to proceed with the
trial without injustice to the defendant
or the state; or

(iv)

The jury is
verdict; or

(v)

False statements of a juror on voir dire
prevent a fair trial.4

unable

to

agree

upon

a

as here, the trial court discharged the jury and

declared a mistrial because the court was incensed at the defense

4

In Nilson,
this Court observed that Section 76-1-403(4) (c)
codifies the so-called "legal necessity" requirements, which
allow a court to terminate a trial without implicating the double
jeopardy clause. See Nilson
854 P.2d at 1031 n. 3
12

counsel, who had taken "exception to the remarks and action of the
court and asked that the record show the same. . .."

Whitman,

74

P. 2d at 697. The Supreme Court reversed the defendant's conviction,
holding that the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing
the jury and declaring a mistrial simply because it was "displeased
with the conduct of counsel for defendant. . . . " Whitman,
at 697.

74 P.2d

The Supreme Court also noted that the trial court did not

make any finding that discharging the jury was the only reasonable
alternative to insure justice under the circumstances.
The Ambrose

See id.

Court similarly approved the same test, stating,

Mh]ere, as in State

v. Whitman,

the court was evidently in doubt

as to ... the propriety of some comments, but the record does not
reveal a determination that discharging the jury was the only
reasonable alternative to insure justice under the circumstances."
Ambrose, 598

P. 2d at 359.

Ambrose

further made clear that if the

trial court exercises discretion in this area, it must make a
record of its reasoning for doing so at the time of the discharge.
"In Utah the trial court is required to make the exercise of its
discretion in the situation a matter of record." Ambrose,
at 360.

In Whitman,

the Court quotes favorably State

v.

598 P.2d
Reed,

Kan. 767, 37 P. 174 (1894), which stated:
. . . the question of the necessity for discharge was to be
heard and determined by judicial methods, and such
methods certainly contemplate that a record of the
findings and determinations of the court should be made.
13

53

It results from the cases that before the court may
discharge a jury to which has been submitted the question
of determining the guilt or innocence of the accused
there should exist, first, a legal necessity for such
discharge; second, the court must make inquiry and find
and determine that such necessity existed at the time of
the discharge; and, third, the essential facts as to such
necessity, and the findings of the court thereon, must be
made a matter of record, or the defendant may
successfully plead former jeopardy when placed on trial
again on the same charge.
Whitman,

74 P. 2d at 698 (quoting State

174 (1894)). See also

v. Reed,

53 Kan. 767, 37 P.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-403(4)(c)

(requiring

the trial court to make findings and state it for the record).
Nilson

is also informative here.

There, the State alleged

that the defendant had sexually abused the victim in 1989.

At

trial, the State's main witness changed his testimony that the
abuse had in fact occurred in 1990. Faced with this contradiction,
the State moved to dismiss and refile the charges based on the new
information provided by the witness.

Defense counsel responded

that he had no objection to the State's motion.

Upon refiling, the

defendant however successfully moved to quash on double jeopardy
grounds.

See Nilson,

854 P.2d at 1030.

On appeal, the State contended that the defendant's statement
that he had no objection to the dismissal demonstrated that he
consented to the termination of the trial.

This Court rejected

that argument, holding that "failure to object or silence should
not be construed as implied consent to a mistrial, particularly
14

wnen

tne

court

object." Id.

acts abruptly

at 1032 {citing

and

Ambrose,

there

is no opportunity

to

598 P.2d at 360) . This Court

went on to find the defendant's response to the State's motion
inadequate to constitute a consent to mistrial, and therefore the
trial court properly granted his motion to quash.

See

id.

Castle anticipates the State contending that Judge Anderson
was legally justified

in discharging the jury and declaring a

mistrial because Castle repeatedly ignored the court's admonitions
See, e.g.,

regarding the scope of cross-examination.

R. 182 (trial

court stating, "The declaration of a mistrial followed a citation
of direct contempt against defendant. The reasons for the contempt
citations are evident from the record and were thereafter detailed
in the order entered by the court pursuant to Section 78-32-3, Utah
Code

(1995).

instructions

Defendant
from

the

not

court,

only
but

ignored

acted

contemporaneous

contrary

to

detailed

instructions laid out for him by the court. . . . " ) .
But the Supreme Court has held that a contemptuous act or
similar conduct
sponte

alone is insufficient to make the trial court sua

discharge a jury and declare a mistrial.

The court is

obligated to consider less drastic alternatives to a mistrial.
Ambrose,

598 P. 2d at 359.

In Whitman,

See

the Court specifically held

that the fact that counsel's conduct may have been "reprehensible,
if not contemptuous," was insufficient for the trial court to force
15

See Whitman,

a mistrial on the defendant.

74 P. 2d at 697-98.

Here, the court became incensed with Castle because he persisted in
asking

Sergeant

Hall,

during

cross-examination,

relevant statute prohibited him from possessing a gun.
363.

whether

the

See R. 359-

As a result of Castle's failure to adhere to admonition, the

court found him in contempt:
The Court:

Mr. Castle, I find you in contempt of court.
Do you have anything to say before I sentence
you?

Mr. Castle:

I demand a jury trial on a contempt of court
charge.

The Court:

All right.
You are not entitled to a jury
trial with that charge.
I sentence you to
thirty days in jail.
Members of the jury,
because this has happened, I'm forced to
declare a mistrial in this case.
I'm
reluctant to do that because it means your
effort here is wasted.

R. 3 62; Addendum VII.
Castle's conduct and remarks are no more reprehensible than
counsel's

conduct

in

Whitman,

mistrial legally unnecessary.
also

Ambrose,

Ambrose,

598 P. 2d at

where

the

Supreme

See Whitman,
359.

Moreover,

Court

found

74 P. 2d at 696; see
as in

Whitman

and

it is apparent that the court consulted neither party

prior to discharging the jury and declaring a mistrial. The record
here is devoid of any discussion of "possible curative alternatives
to a mistrial. Thus,

[there is] no basis from which to conclude

whether the court engaged in the 'scrupulous exercise of judicial
16

discretion7 required when dealing with the important rights here
involved.'7

Ambrose,

consulted with

598 P. 2d at 360.

the parties and advised

Clearly, had the court
that a mistrial was

imminent, Castle would have avoided that drastic sanction and
properly conduct cross-examination as instructed.

See, e.g., R.

169, Addendum VIII (trial court stating that Castle has filed a
statement with the court, after imposition of contempt sentence,
pledging to abide by all court protocol).
Nor did the court make the requisite statutory findings. See
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-403 (4) (c) (requiring the court to make
finding and to state for the record that termination of trial is
necessary) ; see also Ambrose,

598 P. 2d at 3 60 ("the court must make

inquiry and find and determine that such necessary necessity exists
at the time of the discharge. . . and . . . the essential facts as
to such necessity and findings of the court thereon, must be made
a matter of record, or the defendant may successfully plead former
jeopardy when placed on trial again on the same charge") (quoting
Whitman,

74 P.2d at 696 and citing

State

v. Reed,

37 P. at

174).

CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
In summary, there is no doubt that jeopardy attached on July
17, 1995, when a jury was impaneled before Judge Anderson and
Castle was tried for the charges.
Judge Anderson sua

sponte

The record is also clear that

discharged the jury and declared a
17

mistrial

because

Castle was

conducting cross-examination.
contemptuous

found

in

contempt

for

improperly

However, finding Castle's conduct

was alone insufficient to force a mistrial on him.

Further, the court gave neither party opportunity to discuss less
drastic, curative alternatives to a mistrial. Castle certainly did
not consent to the mistrial. See Nilson,

854 P.2d at 1032. And the

court made no contemporaneous finding as to the legal necessity
justifying the mistrial.
Accordingly, the district court erred in denying Castle's
motion to dismiss.

Having been acquitted by Judge Anderson in the

first trial, Castle should not have been subjected a second to
trial before Judge Johansen.

Based on the foregoing, Castle urges

this Court to reverse his in absentia

conviction on double jeopardy

grounds and vacate his sentence.
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT
Oral

argument

is

requested

because

of

the

important

constitutional question involved.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

day of May, 1997.

YENGICH, RICH & XAIZ
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant

BRADLEY P. RICH
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby declare that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Appellant's Opening Brief, postage prepaid, this
day of May, 1997, to Jan Graham, Utah Attorney General and J.
Frederic Voros, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Appeals
Division, Utah Attorney General's Office, P.O. Box 140854, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84114-0854, and the Utah Court of Appeals, 230
South 500 East, #400, Salt Lake City, Utah
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84102.

ADDENDUM I
FINDINGS, JUDGMENT AND COMMITMENT ORDER
(R.369, 430)

SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT
San Juan County

CRAIG C. HALLS #1317
FILED

San Juan County Attorney
P.

0.

BOX

850

Monticello, Utah
Phone 587-2128

1IA1I n r t

tnnn

NOV 2 0 1996
CLERK QF THE COURT

84535
BY

-———^nxR

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH

*

Plaintiff,

*

FINDINGS, JUDGMENT

vs.

AND COMMITMENT

DAVID CASTLE,

*

Defendant(s).

Criminal No. 9417-250

*

THIS MATTER came before the Court for Sentencing on the 20TH
day of NOVEMBER, 1996, before the above entitled Court,

Craig C.

Halls, San Juan County Attorney, attorney for State of Utah, and
Defendant appearing in person and with his attorney, Bradley Rich.
The Defendant agreeing to the arrangements made by counsel,
and waiving the minimum 2-day time period for sentencing, Defendant
having been found guilty by jury trial to charges:
COUNT No. 1: FAILURE TO STOP AT THE COMMAND OF A POLICE
OFFICER, A FELONY 3RD DEGREE.
COUNT No. 2: SPEEDING, CLASS C MISDEMEANOR
COUNT No. 3: INTERFERENCE WITH A PEACE OFFICER MAKING A LAWFUL
ARREST, CLASS B MISDEMEANOR.
COUNT No. 4: ESCAPE, CLASS B MISDEMEANOR
COUNT No. 5: DRIVING WHILE ON SUSPENSION: CLASS C MISDEMEANOR
COUNT No. 6: CARRYING A CONCEALED WEAPON: CLASS B MISDEMANOR
NOW THEREFORE, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED,
that the Defendant be committed to the Utah State Prison to serve
a term not to exceed

FIVE (5) years on Count No. 1, this sentence

is stayed upon the following conditions:

1.

Defendant serve 6 months in the San Juan County Jail.

Credit for time already served.
2.

Defendant pay a fine in the sum of $1250.00.

Sheriff of San Juan County is directed to take him into
custody and deliver him forthwith to the San Juan County Jail.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that the original of this Judgment and
Commitment shall be attested to by the Clerk of the Court and that
a certified copy hereof be delivered to said Sheriff or other
qualified officer and that copy serve as the Commitment of the
Defendant and of the Warrant for the Sheriff in taking into
custody, detaining, and delivering said Defendant.

DATED: November 20, 1996

Ml

Judge Scott Johansen
District Court

SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT
San Juan County

CRAIG C. HALLS #1317
jSan Juan County Attorney
P. 0. Box 850
Monticello, Utah 84535
Phone 587-2128

FILED

MAR - 5 1997
CLERK OF THE COURT

BYDEPUTY

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff,

*

2ND AMENDED JUDGMENT
AND ORDER

vs.
DAVID ELLIOTT CASTLE,

Criminal No. 9417-250

Defendant(s).
Pursuant to the foregoing Motion, it is hereby Ordered that
the above named Defendant, David Castle, be committed to the San
Juan County Jail to continue serving the original sentence as
ordered in the Judgment and Commitment issued November 20th, 1996
by this Court.
All terms of the original order are still in effect^^—~-^3?3^
Dated this -2&feh day of _EeJbruA£y, 1997.

By the Court:

fa'- IT- -

Vv

•*&*•$

ilfe^^

Jud^e Scott Johansen
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
of the foregoing Motion and Order was mailed to
Rich, Attorney for Defendant, arid a copy given to
the San Juan County Jail, this -SfSday of

clertf

X

$

ADDENDUM II
RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES AND RULES

Art. IV, § 4

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

558

AMENDMENT I

AMENDMENT VIII

[Religions and political freedom.]
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances.

[Bail — Punishment.]
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.

AMENDMENT II
[Right to bear arms.]
A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a
free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall
not be infringed.
AMENDMENT HI
[Quartering soldiers.]
No Soldier shall, in time of peace, be quartered in any house,
without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a
manner to be prescribed by law.
AMENDMENT IV
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.]
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.

AMENDMENT IX
[Rights retained by people.]
The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall
not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
people.
AMENDMENT X
[Powers reserved to states or people.]
The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to
the States respectively, or to the people.
AMENDMENT XI
[Suits against states — Restriction of judicial power.]
The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of
another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.
AMENDMENT XH

[Election of President and Vice-President.]
The Electors shall meet in their respective states, and vote
by ballot for President and Vice-President, one of whom, at
least, shall not be an inhabitant of the same state with
themselves; they shall name in their ballots the person voted
,4
AMENDMENT V
for as President, and in distinct ballots the person voted for as
[Criminal actions — Provisions concerning — Due pro- Vice-President, and they shall make distinct lists of all persons voted for. as President, and of all persons voted for as
cess of law and just compensation clauses.]
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise Vice-President, and of the number of votes for each, which lists
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the seat of
Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, the Government of the United States, directed to the Presior in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or dent of the Senate;—The President of the Senate shall, in the
public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be the certificates and the votes shall then be counted;—The
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, person having the greatest number of votes for President,
nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process shall be the President, if such number be a majority of the
whole number of Electors appointed; and if no person have
of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, such majority, then from the persons having the highest
without just compensation.
numbers not exceeding three on the list of those voted for as
President, the House of Representatives shall choose immediately, by ballot, the President. But in choosing the President,
AMENDMENT VI
the votes shall be taken by states, the representation from
[Rights of accused.]
each state having one vote; a quorum for this purpose shall
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the consist of a member or members from two-thirds of the states,^
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the and a majority of all the states shall be necessary to a choice.'
State and district wherein the crime shall have been commit- And if the House of Representatives shall not choose a ted, which district shall have been previously ascertained by President whenever the right of choice shall devolve upon!
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the them, before the fourth day of March next following, then thej
accusation; to he confronted with the witnesses against him; to Vice-President shaft act as President, as in the case of the]
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, death or other constitutional disability of the President.—Thef
and to have the Assistance of counsel for his defence.
person having the greatest number of votes as "Vice-President,!
shall be the Vice-President, if such number be a majority of the|
whole number of Electors appointed, and if no person have aj
AMENDMENT VII
majority, then from the two highest numbers on the list, the!
Senate shall choose the Vice-President; a quorum forthel
[Trial by jury in civil cases.]
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy purpose shall consist of two-thirds of the whole number of!
shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be Senators, and a majority of the whole number shall bej
preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise necessary to a choice. But no person constitutionally ineligible]
re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the office of President shall be eligible to that of Viee|j
President of the United States.
to the rules of the common law.

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
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^AMENDMENT XIII
Section
1. [Slavery prohibited.]
2. [Power to enforce amendment.]
Section 1. [Slavery prohibited.]
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly
convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place
subject to their jurisdiction.
Sec. 2. [Power to enforce a m e n d m e n t ]
Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.
AMENDMENT XIV
Section
1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal protection.]
2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appointment.]
3. [Disqualification to hold office.]
4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of the Confederacy and claims not to be paid.]
5. [Power to enforce amendment.]
Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal
protection.]
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Sec. 2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appointment.]
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several
States according to their respective numbers, counting the
whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not
taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice
of electors for President and Vice-President of the United
States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial Officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature
thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State,
being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United
States, or in &ny way abridged, except for participation in
rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein
shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such
male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens
twenty-one years of age in such State.
Sec. 3. [Disqualification to hold office.]
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress,
or Elector of President and Vice President, or hold any office,
civil or military, under the United States, or under any State,
who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of
any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of
any State, to support the Constitution of the United States,
shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the
same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But
Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove
such disability.

Amend. XVIII, 5 1

and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States
nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation
incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United
States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave;
but all such debts, obligations, and claims shall be held illegal
and void.
Sec. 5. [Power to enforce amendment.]
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article.
AMENDMENT XV
Section
1. [Right of citizens to vote — Race or color not to disqualify.]
2. [Power to enforce amendment.]
Section 1. [Right of citizens to vote — Race or color
not to disqualify.]
The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be
denied or abridged by the United Slates or by any State on
account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.
Sec. 2. [Power to enforce amendment.]
The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by
appropriate legislation.
AMENDMENT XVI
[Income tax.]
The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on
incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any
census or enumeration.
AMENDMENT XVII
[Election of senators.]
The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two
Senators from each State, elected by the people thereof, for six
years; and each Senator shall have one vote. The electors in
each State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors
of the most numerous branch of the State legislatures.
When vacancies happen in the representation of any State
in the Senate, the executive authority of such State shall issue
writs of election to fill such vacancies: Provided, That the
legislature of any State may empower the executive thereof to
make temporary appointments until the people fill the vacancies by election as the legislature may direct.
This amendment shall not be so construed as to affect the
election or term of any Senator chosen before it becomes valid
as part of the Constitution.
AMENDMENT XVUI
[REPEALED DECEMBER 5, 1933. SEE AMENDMENT
XXI, SECTION L]
Section
1. [National prohibition — Intoxicating liquors.]
2. [Concurrent power to enforce amendment.]
3. [Time limit for adoption.]

Section 1. [National prohibition — Intoxicating liSec. 4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of
quors.]
the Confederacy and claims not to be paid.]
After one year from the ratification of this article the
J- The validity of the public debt of the United States, autho- manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors
rized by law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions within, the importation thereof into, or the exportation thereof

Art. I, § 9
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(c) persons charged with any other crime, designated
by statute as one for which bail may be denied, if there is
substantial evidence to support the charge and the court
finds by clear and convincing evidence that the person
would constitute a substantial danger to any other person
or to the community or is likely to flee the jurisdiction of
the court if released on bail.
(2) Persons convicted of a crime are bailable pending appeal
only as prescribed by law.
1988 (2nd as.)

Sec. IS. [Prosecution by information or indictment —
Grand jury.]
Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by indictment, shall be prosecuted by information after examination
and commitment by a magistrate, unless the examination be
waived by the accused with the consent of the State, or by
indictment, with or without such examination and commitment. The formation of the grand jury and the powers and
duties thereof shall be as prescribed by the Legislature. 1947

Sec. 9. [Excessive bail and fines — Cruel punishments.]
Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive tines snail not
be imposed; nor shall cruel and unusual punishments be
inflicted. Persons arrested or imprisoned shall not be treated
with unnecessary
rigor.
1896

Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden — Issuance of warrant.]
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures
shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to
be seized.
1896

Sec. 10. [Trial by jury.]
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall remain
inviolate. In courts of general jurisdiction, except in capital
cases, a jury shall consist of eight jurors. In courts of inferior
jurisdiction a jury shall consist of four jurors. In criminal cases
the verdict shall be unanimous. In civil cases three-fourths of
the jurors may find a verdict. A jury in civil cases shall be
waived unless demanded.
1896
[Trial by jury.] [Proposed.]
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall remain
inviolate. In capital cases the jury shall consist of twelve
persons, and in all other felony cases, the jury shall consist of
no fewer than eight persons. In other cases, the Legislature
shall establish the number ofjurors by statute, but in no event
shall a jury consist of fewer than four persons. In criminal
cases the verdict shall be unanimous. In civil cases threefourths of the jurors may find a verdict. A jury in civil cases
shall be waived unless demanded.
[1996]
Sec. 11. [Courts open — Redress of injuries.]
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done
to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have
remedy by due course of law, which shall be administered
without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be
barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in
this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is
a party.

1896

Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to
appear and defend in person and by counsel, to domand the
nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy
thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by tlio
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel
the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to huve a
speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or
district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed,
and the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any
accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed.
The accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against
himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her
husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person
be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary
examination, the function of that examination is limited to
determining whether probable cause exists unless otherwise
provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall preclude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute
or rule in whole or in part at any preliminary examination to
determine probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding with
respect to release of the defendant if appropriate discovery is
allowed as defined by statute or rule.
ww

Sec. 15. [Freedom of speech and of the press — Libel.]
No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain the freedom of
speech or of the press. In all criminal prosecutions for libel the
truth may be given in evidence to the jury; and if it shall
appear to the jury that the matter charged as libelous is true,
and was published with good motives, and for justifiable ends,
the party shall be acquitted; and the jury shall have the right
to determine the law and the fact.
1896
Sec. 16. [No imprisonment for debt — Exception.]
There shall be no imprisonment for debt except in cases of
absconding debtors.
1896
Sec. 17. [Elections to be free — Soldiers voting.]
All elections shall be free, and no power, civil or military,
shall at any time interfere to prevent the free exercise of the
right of suffrage. Soldiers, in time of war, may vote at their
post of duty, in or out of the State, under regulations to be
prescribed by law.
1896
Sec. 18. [Attainder — Ex post facto laws — Impairing
contracts.]
No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the
obligation of contracts shall be passed.
1896
Sec. 19. [Treason defined — Proof.]
Treason against the State shall consist only in levying war
against it, or in adhering to its enemies or in giving them aid
and comfort. No person shall be convicted of treason unless on
the testimony of two witnesses to tho somo ovort act.
18M
See. 20. [Military subordinate to tho civil power.]
Tho military slwill bo in strict subordination to tho civil
power, and no soldier in time of poaco, shall bo quartered in
any houso without the consent of tho owner; nor in time of war
except in a manner to be prescribed by law.
MM
Sec. 21. [Slavery forblddon.]
"r
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a
punishment for crime, whereof tho party shall have been duly
convicted, shall exist within this State.
18M
Sec. 22. [Private property for public use.]
Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public
use without just compensation.
l&M
Sec. 23. [Irrevocable franchises forbidden.]
No law shall be passed granting irrevocably any franchise,1M
privilege or immunity.
*
Sec. 24. [Uniform operation of laws.]
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation.
18*
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MOTOR VEHICLES

so that some part of its weight and that of its load
rests upon or is carried by another vehicle.
(41) "Shoulder area" means that area of the
hard-surfaced highway separated from the roadway by a pavement edge line as established in
the current approved "Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices," or that portion of the road
contiguous to the roadway for accommodation of
stopped vehicles, for emergency use, and lateral
support.
(42) "Sidewalk" means that portion of a street
between the curb lines, or the lateral lines of a
roadway, and the adjacent property lines intended for the use of pedestrians.
(43) "Solid rubber tire" means every tire of
rubber or other resilient material which does not
depend upon compressed air for the support of
the load.
(44) "Stand" or "standing" means the halting
of a vehicle, whether occupied or not, other than
temporarily for the purpose of and while actually
engaged in receiving or discharging passengers.
(45) "Stop" when required means complete cessation from movement.
(46) "Stop" or "stopping" when prohibited
means any halting even momentarily of a vehicle, whether occupied or not, except when necessary to avoid conflict with other traffic or when
in compliance with the directions of a peace officer or official traffic-control device.
(47) "Traffic" means pedestrians, ridden or
herded animals, vehicles, and other conveyances
either singly or together while using any highway for the purpose of travel.
(48) "Traffic-control signal" means any device,
whether manually, electrically, or mechanically
operated, by which traffic is alternately directed
to stop and permitted to proceed.
(49) "Trailer" means every vehicle with or
without motive power, other than a pole trailer,
designed for carrying persons or property and for
being drawn by a motor vehicle and constructed
so that no part of its weight rests upon the towing vehicle.
(50) "Truck" means every motor vehicle designed, used, or maintained primarily for the
transportation of property.
(51) "Truck tractor" means a motor vehicle designed and used primarily for drawing other vehicles and constructed to carry a part of the
weight of the vehicle and load drawn by the truck
tractor.
(52) "Urban district" means the territory contiguous to and including any street, in which
structures devoted to business, industry, or
dwelling houses are situated at intervals of less
than 100 feet, for a distance of a quarter of a mile
or more.
(53) "Vehicle" means every device in, upon, or
by which any person or property is or may be
transported or drawn upon a highway, except devices used exclusively upon stationary rails or
tracks.
1987
11-6-1.5.

P r i v a t e vehicle a s e m e r g e n c y vehicle
— Rules.
The commissioner of the Department of Public
Safety may make rules, consistent with this chapter,
governing the use, in emergencies, of signal lights on
privately-owned vehicles. The rules may include a
rule allowing privately-owned vehicles to be designated for part-time emergency use.
1987

41-6-2 to 41-6-10.

41-6-13.5
Repealed.

1979

ARTICLE 2

EFFECT OF AND OBEDIENCE TO TRAFFIC
REGULATIONS
41-6-11. Chapter relates to vehicles on highways — Exceptions.
The provisions of this chapter relating to the operation of vehicles refer exclusively to the operation of
vehicles upon highways, except:
(1) where a different place is specifically referred to in a given section; or
(2) under the provisions of Section 41-6-13.5
and Sections 41-6-29 to 41-6-45 inclusive, which
apply upon highways and elsewhere throughout
the state.
1987
41-6-12. Violations of c h a p t e r — P e n a l t i e s .
(1) A violation of any provision of this chapter is a
class C misdemeanor, unless otherwise provided.
(2) A violation of any provision of Articles 2, 11,
15, and 17 of this chapter is an infraction, unless
otherwise provided.
1993
41-6-13.

O b e d i e n c e to p e a c e officer or other
traffic controllers.
(1) A person may not willfully fail or refuse to comply with any lawful order or direction of any peace
officer, fireman, flagger at a highway construction or
maintenance site, or uniformed adult school crossing
guard invested by law with authority to direct, control, or regulate traffic.
(2) When flaggers at highway construction or
maintenance sites are directing traffic they shall use
devices and procedures conforming to the latest edition of the "Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices for Streets and Highways."
1987
41-6-13.5.

Failure to r e s p o n d to officer's signal
to stop — F l e e i n g — Causing property
d a m a g e or bodily injury — S u s p e n s i o n
of driver's l i c e n s e — Forfeiture of vehicle — P e n a l t i e s .
(1) An operator who, having received a visual or
audible signal from a peace officer to bring his vehicle
to a stop, operates his vehicle in willful or wanton
disregard of the signal so as to interfere with or endanger the operation of any vehicle or person, or who
attempts to flee or elude a peace officer by vehicle or
other means is guilty of a felony of the third degree.
The court shall, as part of any sentence under this
subsection, impose a fine of not less than $1,000.
(2) An operator who violates Subsection (1) and
while so doing causes death or serious bodily injury to
another person, under circumstances not amounting
to murder or aggravated murder, is guilty of a felony
of the second degree. The court shall, as part of any
sentence under this subsection, impose a fine of not
less than $5,000.
(3) (a) In addition to the penalty provided under
this section or any other section, an operator
who, having received a visual or audible signal
from a peace officer to bring his vehicle to a stop,
operates his vehicle in willful or wanton disregard of the signal so as to interfere with or endanger the operation of any vehicle or person, or
who attempts to flee or elude a peace officer by
vehicle or other means, shall have his driver's
license
revoked
pursuant
to
Subsection
41-2-127(l)(h) [53-3-220(l)(h)J for a period of one
year.
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(b) state that the registered owner is responsible for payment of towing, impound, and storage
fees charged against the vehicle; and
(c) inform the registered owner of the vehicle
of the conditions under Subsection (5) that must
be satisfied before the vehicle is released.
(5) (a) The impounded vehicle shall be released after the registered owner or the owner's agent:
(i) makes a claim in person for release of
the vehicle at any office of the State Tax
Commission;
(ii) pays an administrative impound fee of
$25;
(iii) presents identification sufficient to
prove ownership of the impounded vehicle;
and
(iv) pays all towing and storage fees to the
impound lot where the vehicle is stored,
(b) All impound fees assessed under this subsection are dedicated credits to the Motor Vehicle
Division.
(6) An impounded vehicle not claimed by the registered owner or the owner's agent within the time prescribed by Section 41-la-1103 shall be sold in accordance with that section and the proceeds, if any, disposed of under Section 41-la-1103. The date of impoundment is considered the date of seizure for computing the time period provided in Section
41-la-1103.
(7) The registered owner of the vehicle upon the
payment of all fees and charges incurred in the seizure and impoundment of the owner's vehicle has a
cause of action for all the fees and charges, together
with damages, court costs, and attorney fees, against
the operator of the vehicle whose actions caused the
impoundment.

(e) special hazards exist due to pedestrians,
other traffic, weather, or highway conditions.
(2) If no special hazard exists, and subject to Subsection (4) and Sections 41-6-47 and 41-6-48, the following speeds are lawful:
(a) 20 miles per hour in a reduced speed school
zone as defined in Section 41-6-20.1;
(b) 25 miles per hour in any urban district;
(c) 65 miles per hour on highways where this
speed limit does not impair the ability of the
state to qualify for federal highway funds; and
(d) 55 miles per hour in other locations.
(3) Except as provided in Section 41-6-48.5, any
speed in excess of the limits provided in Subsection
(2) is prima facie evidence that the speed is not reasonable or prudent and that it is unlawful.

(8) Liability may not be imposed upon any peace
officer, the state, or any of its political subdivisions on
account of the enforcement of this section.
1992

41-6-48. Speed restrictions — Powers of local
authorities — Posted speed.
(1) When local authorities in their respective jurisdictions determine on the basis of an engineering and
traffic investigation that the prima facie speed permitted under this article is not reasonable and safe
under the conditions found to exist upon a highway or
part of a highway, the local authority may determine
a reasonable and safe prima facie limit which:
(a) decreases the limit at intersections;
(b) increases the limit within an urban district; or
(c) decreases the limit outside an urban district, but not to less than 35 miles per hour.
(2) Local authorities in their respective jurisdictions shall determine by an engineering and traffic
investigation the prima facie speed for all highways
under their respective jurisdictions and shall declare
a reasonable and safe prima facie limit, which may be
different than the prima facie speed permitted under
this chapter for an urban district.
(3) Any limit altered under this section is effective
when appropriate signs giving notice are erected
upon the highway.

41-6-45.

(4) The governor by proclamation in time of war or
emergency may change the speed limits on the highways of the state.
1994
41-6-47.

(2) The speed limit is effective when appropriate
signs giving notice are erected a t the intersection or
other place or part of the highway.
1988

R e c k l e s s driving — P e n a l t y .

(1) A person who operates any vehicle in willful or
wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property
is guilty of reckless driving.
(2) A person convicted of reckless driving is guilty
of a class B misdemeanor. Upon a first conviction, the
penalty is a minimum term of imprisonment of not
fewer than five days, or a minimum fine of not less
than $25. On a second or subsequent conviction, the
penalty is a minimum term of imprisonment of not
fewer than ten days, or a minimum fine of not less
than $50.

P r i m a facie s p e e d limit.

(1) (a) When the Department of Transportation determines upon the basis of an engineering and
traffic investigation that any prima facie speed
under this article is not reasonable or safe under
the existing conditions at any intersection or
other place or on a state highway, the Department of Transportation may determine a reasonable and safe prima facie speed limit.
(b) When changing a speed limit, the Department of Transportation shall consult with local
political units prior to erecting or changing any
signs within local political boundaries.

1987

ARTICLE 6

I

SPEED RESTRICTIONS

j

41-6-46. Speed regulations — Safe and appropriate speeds at certain locations —
Prima facie speed limits — Emergency
power of the governor.
(1) A person may not operate a vehicle at a speed
greater than is reasonable and prudent under the existing conditions, giving regard to the actual and potential hazards then existing, including when:
(a) approaching and crossing an intersection
or railroad grade crossing;
(b) approaching and going around a curve;
(c) approaching a hill crest;
(d) traveling upon any narrow or winding
roadway; and

[
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(4) The Department of Transportation determines
prima facie evidence of a lawful speed on state highways whether the highways are within or without the
corporate limits of any city.
1987
41-6-48.5.

Maximum speed in a school zone —
Penalty — Minimum fines — Commu-

nity service — Recordkeeping.
( D A person may not operate a vehicle at a speed
greater than 20 miles per hour in a reduced speed
school zone as defined in Section 41-6-20.1.
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(ii) Section 53-3-221, for failing to comply
with the terms of a traffic citation.
(c) (i) The length of the revocation required by
Subsection 53-3-220(l)(a)(xi), (a)(xii), (b)(i),
or (b)(ii) shall be specified in an order of the
court adjudicating or convicting the person
of the offense.
(ii) If the person adjudicated of the offense
is younger t h a n 16 years of age, the license
or driving privilege shall be revoked for a
minimum of one year, from age 16, but not to
exceed the date the person t u r n s 21 years of
age.
(iii) If t h e person adjudicated or convicted
of the offense is 16 years of age or older, the
license or driving privilege shall be revoked
for a minimum of one year, but not to exceed
five years.
(d) A revoked license may not be renewed.
(e) Application for a new license shall be filed
in accordance with Section 53-3-205.
(0 The new license is subject to all provisions
of an original license.
(g) The division may not grant the license
until an investigation of the character, driving
abilities, and habits of the driver has been made
to indicate whether it is safe to grant him a license.
(2) Any resident or nonresident whose license to
drive a motor vehicle in this state has been suspended
or revoked under this chapter may not drive a motor
vehicle in this state under a license, permit, or registration certificate issued by any other jurisdiction or
other source during suspension or after revocation
until a new license is obtained under this chapter.
1993 (2nd S.S.)

53-3-226. Grounds for confiscation of licenses,
plates, and other articles issued by
state — Additional fee for reinstatement.
(1) (a) The division, any peace officer acting in his
official capacity, or a person authorized under
Subsection (2) m a y take possession of any certificate of title, registration card, decal, permit, license certificate, registration plate, or any other
article issued by the state:
(i) upon expiration, denial, suspension,
disqualification, revocation, alteration, or
cancellation of it;
(ii) t h a t is fictitious;
(iii) t h a t has been unlawfully or erroneously issued; or
(iv) t h a t is unlawfully or erroneously displayed.
(b) A receipt shall be issued t h a t describes
each confiscated item.
(2) The division may enter into contractual agreements with constables or other law enforcement
agencies to facilitate confiscation of items listed in
Subsection (1) if a person fails or refuses to surrender
any of those documents to the division upon demand.
(3) The division shall assess against a person making an application referred to in Subsection
53-3-205(14), in addition to any fee imposed under
Subsection 53-3-205(14), a fee under Section
53-3-105, which shall be paid before the person's driving privilege is reinstated, to cover the costs required
to serve orders related to the purposes of Subsection
(2).

1993

53-3-229

53-3-227. Driving a motor vehicle prohibited
while license denied, suspended, disqualified, or revoked — Penalties.
(1) A person whose license has been denied, suspended, disqualified, or revoked under this chapter or
under the laws of the state in which his license was
issued and who drives any motor vehicle upon the
highways of this state while t h a t license is denied,
suspended, disqualified, or revoked shall be punished
as provided in this section.
(2) A person convicted of a violation of Subsection
(1), other t h a n a violation specified in Subsection (3),
is guilty of a class C misdemeanor.
(3) (a) A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor
whose conviction under Subsection (1) is based on
his driving a motor vehicle while his license is
suspended, disqualified, or revoked for:
(i) a refusal to submit to a chemical test
under Section 41-6-44.10;
(ii) a violation of Section 41-6-44;
(iii) a violation of a local ordinance t h a t
complies with the requirements of Section
41-6-43;
(iv) a violation of Section 41-6-44.6;
(v) a violation of Section 76-5-207;
(vi) a criminal action t h a t the person
plead guilty to as a result of a plea bargain
after having been originally charged with violating one or more of the sections or ordinances under this subsection;
(vii) a revocation or suspension which h a s
been extended under Subsection 53-3-220
(2); or
(viii) where disqualification is the result
of driving a commercial motor vehicle while
the person's CDL is disqualified, suspended,
canceled, or revoked under Subsection
53-3-414(1).
(b) A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor
whose conviction under Subsection (1) is based
upon his driving a motor vehicle while his license
is suspended, disqualified, or revoked in his state
of licensure for violations corresponding to the
violations listed in Subsection (a). '
(c) A fine imposed under this subsection shall
be at least the maximum fine for a class C misdemeanor under Section 76-3-301.
1994
53-3-228. Making false affidavit is perjury.
A person who makes any false affidavit or knowingly swears or affirms falsely, to any m a t t e r or thing
required under this chapter to be sworn to or affirmed, is guilty of perjury.
1993

53-3-229. Prohibited uses of license certificate
— Penalty.
It is a class C misdemeanor for a person to:
(1) display, cause or permit to be displayed, or
to have in possession any license certificate
knowing it is fictitious or has been canceled, denied, revoked, suspended, disqualified, or altered;
(2) lend or knowingly permit the use of a license certificate issued to him, by a person not
entitled to it;
(3) display or to represent as his own a license
certificate not issued to him;
(4) fail or refuse to surrender to the division
upon demand any license certificate t h a t has
been denied, suspended, disqualified, canceled, or
revoked;
(5) use a false name or give a false address in
any application for a license or any renewal or
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viction for an included offense and the trier of fact
necessarily found every fact required for conviction of
that included offense, the verdict or judgment of conviction may be set aside or reversed and a judgment
of conviction entered for the included offense, without
necessity of a new trial, if such relief is sought by the
defendant.
1974
76-1-403. Former prosecution barring subsequent prosecution for offense out of
same episode.
(1) If a defendant has been prosecuted for one or
more offenses arising out of a single criminal episode,
a subsequent prosecution for the same or a different
offense arising out of the same criminal episode is
barred if:
(a) The subsequent prosecution is for an offense that was or should have been tried under
Subsection 76-1-402(2) in the former prosecution;
and
(b) The former prosecution:
(i) resulted in acquittal; or
(ii) resulted in conviction; or
(iii) was improperly terminated; or
(iv) was terminated by a final order or
judgment for the defendant that has not been
reversed, set aside, or vacated and that necessarily required a determination inconsistent with a fact that must be established to
secure conviction in the subsequent prosecution.
(2) There is an acquittal if the prosecution resulted
in a finding of not guilty by the trier of facts or in a
determination that there was insufficient evidence to
warrant conviction. A finding of guilty of a lesser
included offense is an acquittal of the greater offense
even though the conviction for the lesser included
offense is subsequently reversed, set aside, or vacated.
(3) There is a conviction if the prosecution resulted
in a judgment of guilt that has not been reversed, set
aside, or vacated; a verdict of guilty that has not been
reversed, set aside, or vacated and that is capable of
supporting a judgment; or a plea of guilty accepted by
the court.
(4) There is an improper termination of prosecution if the termination takes place before the verdict,
is for reasons not amounting to an acquittal, and
takes place after a jury has been impanelled and
sworn to try the defendant, or, if the jury trial is
waived, after the first witness is sworn. However, termination of prosecution is not improper if:
(a) The defendant consents to the termination;
or
(b) The defendant waives his right to object to
the termination;
(c) The court finds and states for the record
that the termination is necessary because:
(i) It is physically impossible to proceed
with the trial in conformity with the law; or
(ii) There is a legal defect in the proceeding not attributable to the state that would
make any judgment entered upon a verdict
reversible as a matter of law; or
(iii) Prejudicial conduct in or out of the
courtroom not attributable to the state
makes it impossible to proceed with the trial
without injustice to the defendant or the
state; or
(iv) The jury is unable to agree upon a
verdict; or

4

(v) False statements of a juror on voir dire
prevent a fair trial.
1974
76-1-404. Concurrent jurisdiction — P r o s e c u tion i n other jurisdiction barring prosecution in state.
If a defendant's conduct establishes the commission
of one or more offenses within the concurrent jurisdiction of this state and of another jurisdiction, federal
or state, the prosecution in the other jurisdiction is a
bar to a subsequent prosecution in this state if (1) the
former prosecution resulted in an acquittal, conviction, or termination of prosecution, as those terms are
defined in Section 76-1-403, and (2) the subsequent
prosecution is for the same offense or offenses.
1973
76-1-405. Subsequent prosecution not barred —
Circumstances.
A subsequent prosecution for an offense shall not
be barred under the following circumstances:
(1) The former prosecution was procured by
the defendant without the knowledge of the prosecuting attorney bringing the subsequent prosecution and with intent to avoid the sentence that
might otherwise be imposed; or
(2) The former prosecution resulted in a judgment of guilt held invalid in a subsequent proceeding on writ of habeas corpus, coram nobis, or
similar collateral attack.
1973
PART 5
BURDEN OF PROOF
76-1-501. Presumption of innocence — "Element of the offense" defined.
(1) A defendant in a criminal proceeding is presumed to be innocent until each element of the offense charged against him is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In absence of such proof, the defendant
shall be acquitted.
(2) As used in this part the words "element of the
offense" mean:
(a) The conduct, attendant circumstances, or
results of conduct proscribed, prohibited, or forbidden in the definition of the offense;
(b) The culpable mental state required.
(3) The existence of jurisdiction and venue a r e not
elements of the offense b u t shall be established by a
preponderance of the evidence.
1973
76-1-502. Negating defense b y allegation or
proof — When n o t required.
Section 76-1-501 does not require negating a defense:
(1) By allegation in an information, indictment, or other charge; or
(2) By proof, unless:
(a) The defense is in issue in the case as a
result of evidence presented at trial, either
by the prosecution or the defense; or
(b) T h e defense is an affirmative defense,
and the defendant h a s presented evidence of
such affirmative defense.
1973
76-1-503. P r e s u m p t i o n of fact.
An evidentiary presumption established by this
code or other penal statute h a s the following consequences:
(1) When evidence of facts which support the
presumption exist, t h e issue of t h e existence of
the presumed fact must be submitted to the jury
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Prevention of Legislature or public
servants from meeting or organizing.
A person is guilty of a felony of the third degree if
he intentionally and by force or fraud:
(1) Prevents the Legislature, or either of the
houses composing it, or any of the members
thereof, from meeting or organizing; or
(2) Prevents any other public servant from
meeting or organizing to perform a lawful governmental function.
1973
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(2) An offense under Subsections (l)(a) through (f)
is a class B misdemeanor, unless the actor knows that
the offender committed a capital offense or a felony o f
the first degree, in which case the offense is a second
degree felony.
(3) An offense under Subsection (l)(g) is a third
degree felony.
(4) Subsection (1)(0 does not appfy to an act
against a juror. Obstructing the function of a juror is
addressed in Section 76-8-508.5.
iwi

76-8-304.
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76-8-307. Failure to aid p e a c e officer.
A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if, upon
command by a peace officer identifiable or identified
by him as such, he unreasonably fails or refuses to
aid the peace officer in effecting an arrest or in preventing the commission of any offense by another
lfl73
person.
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76-8-308.
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he:

76-8-303.

Disturbing Legislature or official
meeting.
(1) A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if
he intentionally:
(a) disturbs the Legislature, or either of the
houses composing it, while in session;
(b) commits any disorderly conduct in the immediate view and presence of either house of the
Legislature, tending to interrupt its proceedings
or impair the respect of its authority; or
(c) disturbs an official meeting or commits any
disorderly conduct in immediate view and presence of participants in an official meeting tending to interrupt its proceedings.
(2) "Official meeting," as used in this section,
means any lawful meeting of public servants for the
purposes of carrying on governmental functions. 1992
76-8-305. Interference w i t h arresting officer.
A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if he
has knowledge, or by the exercise of reasonable care
should have knowledge, that a peace officer is seeking to effect a lawful arrest or detention of that person or another and interferes with the arrest or detention by:
^
(1) use of force or any weapon;
(2) the arrested person's refusal to perform
any act required by lawful order:
(a) necessary to effect the arrest or detention; and
(b) made by a peace officer involved in the
arrest or detention; or
(3) the arrested person's or another person's
refusal to refrain from performing any *act that
would impede the arrest or detention.
1990
76-8-306. Obstructing justice.
(1) A person is guilty of an offense if, with intent to
hinder, prevent, or delay the discovery, apprehension,
prosecution, conviction, or punishment of another for
the commission of a crime, he:
(a) knowing an offense has been committed,
conceals it from a magistrate;
(b) harbors or conceals the offender;
(c) provides the offender a weapon, transportation, disguise, or other means for avoiding discovery or apprehension;
(d) warns the offender of impending discovery
or apprehension;
(e) conceals, destroys, or alters any physical
evidence that might aid in the discovery, apprehension, or conviction of the person;
(f) obstructs by force, intimidation, or deception anyone from performing an act that might
aid in the discovery, apprehension, prosecution,
or conviction of the person; or
(g) having knowledge that a law enforcement
officer has been authorized or has applied for authorization under either Section 77-23a-10 or
77-23a-15 to intercept a wire, electronic, or oral
communication, gives notice or attempts to give
notice of the possible interception to any person.

Acceptance of bribe or bribery to prevent criminal prosecution — Defense.
( D A person is guilty of a class A misdemeanor if

(a) solicits, accepts, or agrees to accept any
benefit as consideration for his refraining from
initiating or aiding in a criminal prosecution; or
(b) confers, offers, or agrees to confer any benefit
upon another as consideration for the person
refraining from initiating or aiding in a criminal
prosecution.
(2) It is an affirmative defense that the value of the
benefit did not exceed an amount which the actor
believed to be due as restitution or indemnification
for the loss caused or to be caused by the offense. 1991
76-8-309. Escape — Term for escape from state
prison.
(1) A person is guilty of escape if he escapes from
official custody.
(2) The offense is a felony of the second degree if:
(a) The actor employs force, threat, or a deadly
weapon against any person to effect the escape;
or
.
(b) The actor escapes from confinement in the
state prison. Otherwise, escape is a class B misdemeanor.
(3) "Official custody," for the purpose of this section, means arrest, custody in a penal institution, jail,
an institution for confinement of juvenile offenders,
or other confinement pursuant to an order of the
court. For purposes of this section a person is deemed
to be confined in the Utah state prison if he has been
sentenced and committed and the sentence has not
been terminated or voided or the prisoner is not on
parole.
(4) The term imposed upon a person escaping confinement
in the state prison shall commence from the
time the actor would otherwise have been discharged
from the prison on the term or terms which he was
197S
serving.
76-8-310. A i d i n g e s c a p e .
(1) A person is guilty of an offense if:
(a) He aids another person to escape from official custody; or
(b) He knowingly provides a person in official
custody with anything which may facilitate such
person's escape; or
(c) Being a person in official custody, he knowingly procures, makes, or possesses anything
which may facilitate escape.
(2) An offense under this section is a felony of the
second degree if:

76-10-503
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an unexpended cartridge, shell, or projectile in the
firing position.
(2) Pistols and revolvers shall also be deemed to be
loaded when an unexpended cartridge, shell, or projectile is in a position whereby the manual operation
of any mechanism once would cause the unexpended
cartridge, shell, or projectile to be fired.
(3) A muzzle loading firearm shall be deemed to be
loaded when it is capped or primed and has a powder
charge and ball or shot in the barrel or cylinders. 1990
76-10-503. Purchase or possession of dangerous
weapon/handgun — Persons not permitted to have — Penalties.
(1) (a) Any person who has been convicted of any
crime of violence under the laws of the United
States, this state, or any other state, government,
or country, or who is addicted to the use of any
narcotic drug, or who has been declared mentally
incompetent may not own or have in his possession or under his custody or control any dangerous weapon as defined in this part.
(b) Any person who violates this subsection is
guilty of a class A misdemeanor, and if the dangerous weapon is a firearm or sawed-off shotgun,
he is guilty of a third degree felony.
(2) (a) Any person who is on parole or probation
for a felony may not have in his possession or
under his custody or control any dangerous
weapon as defined in this part.
(b) Any person who violates this subsection is
guilty of a third degree felony, but if the dangerous weapon is a firearm, explosive, or incendiary
device he is guilty of a second degree felony.
(3) (a) A person may not purchase, possess, or
transfer any handgun described in this part who:
(i) has been convicted of any felony offense
under the laws of the United States, this
state, or any other state;
(ii) is under indictment;
(iii) is an unlawful user of a controlled
substance as defined in Section 58-37-2;
(iv) is a drug dependent person as defined
in Section 58-37-2;
(v) has been adjudicated as mentally defective, as provided in the Brady Handgun
Violence Prevention Act, Pub. L. No.
103-159, 107 Stat. 1536 (1993), or has been
committed to a mental institution;
(vi) is an alien who is illegally or unlawfully in the United States;
(vii) has been discharged from the Armed
Forces under dishonorable conditions; or
(viii) is a person who, having been a citizen of the United States, has renounced such
citizenship,
(b) Any person who violates Subsection (3) is
guilty of a third degree felony.
1994
76-10-504. Carrying c o n c e a l e d d a n g e r o u s w e a p on.
(1) Any person, except those persons described in
Section 76-10-503 and those persons exempted under
Section 76-10-510, carrying a concealed dangerous
weapon, as defined in this Part 5, is guilty of a class B
misdemeanor, except that a firearm that contains no
ammunition and is enclosed in a case, gun box, or
securely-tied package shall not be considered a concealed weapon, but:
(a) If the dangerous weapon is a firearm and
contains no ammunition, he shall be guilty of a
class B misdemeanor;

86

(b) If the dangerous weapon is a firearm and
contains ammunition, he shall be guilty of a class
A misdemeanor; or
(c) If the dangerous weapon is a sawed-off
shotgun, or if the dangerous weapon is a firearm
and is used to commit a crime of violence, he
shall be guilty of a felony of the third degree.
(2) Nothing in this Part 5 shall prevent any person, except persons described in Section 76-10-503,
from keeping within his place of residence, place of
business, or any vehicle under his control any firearm, except that it shall be a class B misdemeanor to
carry a loaded firearm in a vehicle.
1982
76-10-505. Carrying loaded firearm in vehicle,
on street, or in prohibited area.
(1) Unless otherwise authorized by law, a person
may not carry a loaded firearm:
(a) in or on a vehicle;
(b) on any public street; or
(c) in a posted prohibited area.
(2) A violation of this section is a class B misdemeanor.
1990
76-10-505.5. Possession of a dangerous weapon,
firearm, or sawed-off shotgun on or
about school premises — Penalty.
(1) A person may not possess any dangerous
weapon, firearm, or sawed-off shotgun at a place that
the person knows, or has reasonable cause to believe,
is on or about school premises.
(2) (a) Possession of a dangerous weapon on or
about school premises is a class B misdemeanor.
(b) Possession of a firearm or sawed-off shotgun on or about school premises is a class A misdemeanor.
(3) This section applies to any person, except persons authorized to possess a firearm as provided under Sections 53-5-704, 53-5-705, 53A-3-502, 76-10510, 76-10-511, 76-10-523, and Subsection 76-10504(2) and as otherwise authorized by law.
(4) This section does not prohibit prosecution of a
more serious weapons offense that may occur on or
about school premises.
1993
76-10-506. Threatening with or using dangerous
w e a p o n in fight or quarrel.
Every person, except those persons described in
Section 76-10-503, who, not in necessary self defense
in the presence of two or more persons, draws or exhibits any dangerous weapon in an angry and threatening manner or unlawfully uses the same in any
fight or quarrel is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
1992

76-10-507. Possession of deadly weapon with intent to assault.
Every person having upon his person any dangerous weapon with intent to unlawfully assault another
is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
1973
76-10-508. Discharge of firearm from a vehicle,
near highway, or in direction of any
person, building, or vehicle.
(1) A person may not discharge any kind of firearm:
(a) from an automobile or other vehicle; or
(b) from, upon, or across any highway.
(2) A violation of any provision of this section is a
class B misdemeanor unless the actor discharges a
firearm under any of the following circumstances not
amounting to criminal homicide or attempted criminal homicide, in which case it is a third degree felony:

ADDENDUM III
RULING ON MOTION TO DISMISS
(R.181)

SEVENTH DISTRICT COUfii
San Juan County
F/LED OCT 1 3 1995
CLERK OF rHECOURV
8V
DEPUTY

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

RULING ON MOTION
TO DISMISS

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.
DAVID CASTLE,
Defendant.

Case No. 9417-250

Defendant has moved to dismiss on the authority of State v.
Ambrose. 598 P.2d 354 (Utah 1979).

The state has objected and

filed a memorandum supporting its objection.
Ambrose is a 3-2 decision of the Utah Supreme Court, and may
accordingly be considered as close to the margin of double jeopardy
jurisprudence.
arguing —

Ambrose involved prosecutorial misconduct for

in the presence of the jury —

that the considerable

expense incurred by the state, the county and the defendant
warranted further efforts to reach a verdict.1
Because the court abruptly declared a mistrial after defense
counsel claimed error on the prosecutor's comments, a majority of
the Utah Supreme Court held that retrial of defendant would violate
his double jeopardy rights.

*It is interesting that many verdict urging instructions in current use allow the judge to
point out to jurors the considerable investment involved in submitting a case for deliberation.

•

This

is

not

a

case

where

the

mistrial

resulted

from

prosecutorial or judicial misconduct, nor where the reasons for the
mistrial are unclear.

The declaration of a mistrial followed a

citation of direct contempt against defendant. The reasons for the
contempt citations are evident from the record and were thereafter
detailed in the order entered by the court pursuant to Section 7832-3, Utah code (1995). Defendant not only ignored contemporaneous
instructions

from the court, but

acted

contrary

to detailed

instructions laid out for him by the court on April 20, 1995, when
the trial date was selected.
The misconduct of defendant alone was sufficient to create a
substantial likelihood that jurors would be diverted from their
fact finding role, become confused about the law, and incline to
decide the case based upon an emotional reaction to the courtroom
spectacle created by defendant. Under those circumstances, neither
the defendant nor the state could receive a fair trial.

The

mistrial was therefore necessitated by intentional and contemptuous
conduct of defendant that deprived the state of its right to a fair
trial.

Under those circumstances, the constitutional

double

jeopardy bar is not invoked.
The motion to dismiss is denied. This matter will proceed to
trial on October 27, 1995.
The court once again encourages defendant to reconsider his
decision to refuse licensed, appointed or standby counsel and
reminds

defendant

of the conditions

set

forth

in the order

suspending the last ten days of defendant's sentence for contempt

of court.

Defendant is ordered to comply with those conditions.

DATED the

day of October, 1995.

Court Judge

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing RULING ON
MOTION TO DISMISS, postage prepaid, to the following:
Craig C. Halls
San Juan County Attorney
P.O. Box 850
Monticello, UT 84535

David Castle
6101 Menaul N.E.
Albuquerque, NM 87117

i Ji'«5»SJ3

SB Court Clerk
District!

ADDENDUM IV
VERDICT (R.334)

^

;ffi2H996
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In The Seventh Judicial District Court Of San Juan CountyState of Utah
THE STATE OF DTAH#
Plaintiff,

VERDICT

Vt3 ,

P/WID CASThK,
Defendant.

I .Li

N

1 1 7 ,!'>()

We, the Jurors in the above case, find the defendant David Castle,
Guilty

Not Guilty
Failure To Stop At The Command Of A Police Officer
Speeding
Interference With A Peace Officer Making A Lawful
Arrest

\/
^

Escape
Driving While On Suspension Or Revocation In Another
State

i /

Carrying A Concealed Weapon

DATED this 3*0

-o

day of

///^M.-^,

, A.D., 1996

Foreman
IT

Filed
C.A

JC\\<AAV\

^CVrfc./

,1996
Deputy C l e r k

ff

ADDENDUM V
ORDER OF CONTEMPT
(R.166)
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In The Seventh Judicial District Court Of San Juan County
State of Utah

ORDER OP CONTEMPT

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 9417-250

DAVID ELLIOTT CASTLE,
Defendant.

Th :i s ::>i:clei: i s made
(1995),

I i» S t

le

During his trial on July 17, 1995, David Elliott Castle

committed acts contemptuous of the authority of the court by:
1.

Ignoring rulings of the court on evidentiary matters and

persisting with questions after several rulings from the court that
the matters were irrelevant and instructions to stop ask :i ng the
questions.
2.

Stating during opening statements to the jury that he

held the court in nothing but contempt.
3.

Ignoring instructions from the presiding judge to refer

to the judge as Judge Anderson or your honor, and using instead the
given name of the ji idge.
4.

Arguing with the judge after having been told repeatedly

that the ruling was final and that he should proceed with his next
1

line of questions.
5.

Making comments to members of the jury after the court

had ruled on a disputed matter.
The

foregoing

acts

of

David

Elliott

Castle

constitute

disorderly, contemptuous and insolent behavior toward the judge
while holding the court, tending to interrupt the due course of the
trial, and disobedience of a lawful order of the court committed in
the immediate view and presence of the court.

Defendant was

accordingly, summarily found in contempt of court, and after having
declined his right to speak before sentence was imposed, sentenced
to 30 days in the San Juan County Jail pursuant to Sections 78-3210, Utah code (1995).
A commitment was thereupon issued placing defendant in the
custody of the San Juan County Sheriff to serve out the sentence.

DATED the

of July, 1995.

2

C E R T I F I C A T E O P !"» I ' nil I „, I INN!
I
correct

l u e t f . i l i ••• •' • " ^ M - I
copies

the

I mailed

foregoing

or

Land

ORDER

OF

de L i v e r e d

tune

dial

to

the

CONTEMPT,

following:

Craig C, Halls
San Juan County Attorney
PO Box 850
Monticello, UT 8453 5

DATED the

David Elliott Castle
San Juan County Jail
297 South Main
Monticello, UT 84 53 5

day of July, 1995.
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ADDENDUM VI
DISTRICT COURT DOCKET SHEET

7TH DISTRICT COURT- MONTICELLO COURT
SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH VS. DAVID ELLIOTT CASTLE
CASE NUMBER 94.1700250 State Felony

March 13, 1997

CHARGES
Charge
FAIL TO STOP/RESP AT COMMAND OF POLICE - 3rd Degree
Felony
Disposition: March 20, 1996 Guilty - Jury
Charge 2 - SPEEDING - Class C Misdemeanor
Disposition: March 20, 1996 Guilty - Jury
Charge 3 - INTERFERING W/ LEGAL ARREST - Class B Misdemeanor
Disposition: March 20, 1996 Guilty - Jury
Charge 4 - ESCAPE FROM OFFICIAL CUSTODY - Class B Misdemeanor
Disposition: March 20, 1996 Guilty - Jury
Charge 5 - DRIVE ON DENIED LICENSE (amended) - Class C
Misdemeanor
Disposition: March 20, 1996 Guilty - Jury
Charge 6 - CARRYING CONCEALED DANGEROUS WEAPON
Class B
Misdemeanor
Disposition: March 20, 1996 Guilty - Jury
PARTIES
Plaintiff - STATE OF UTAH
Represented by: CRAIG C. HALLS
Defendant - DAVID ELLIOTT CASTLE
6101 MENAUL BLVD NE
ALBUQUERQUE, NM 87110
Represented by: BRADLEY P. RICH
Payor - PAULA CASTLE
11101 KIELICH AVE NORTH EAST
ALBUQUERQUE, UT 87111
Payor - DAVID CASTLE
6101 MENAUL BLVD NE
ALBUQUERQUE, NM 87110
Payee -

SEVENTH DISTRICT

'

Payor - BRADLEY RICH
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Defendant Name: DAVID ELLIOTT CASTLE
Date of Birth: December 25, 1942
Social Security Number:
Driver License Number: 0
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Case No: 941700250
Date:
Mar. 13, 1997
Driver License State: UT
Law Enforcement Agency: Utah Highway Patrol
Prosecuting Agency: SAN JUAN COUNTY
Agency Case Number:
Arrest Date: September 26, 1994
Violation Date: September 26, 1994
CASE NOTE
****RELEASED ON $7000.00 CASH BAIL****
PROCEEDINGS
09-26-94
09-26-94
09-26-94
09-26-94
09-26-94
09-26-94
09-27-94
10-20-94
10-20-94
10-20-94
10-20-94
10-20-94
10-20-94
10-20-94
10-20-94
10-20-94
10-20-94
10-20-94
10-20-94
10-20-94
10-20-94
10-20-94
10-20-94
10-20-94
10-20-94
10-20-94
10-20-94
10-20-94
10-20-94
10-20-94
10-21-94
10-27-94
11-01-94
11-01-94
11-25-94

Bail paid in
Judge JOHANSEN assigned.
convert
Bail Posted
Payment Received:
7,000.00
ilas
FLD: INFORMATION
ilas
ARRAIGNMENT FELONY scheduled on October 20, 1994 at 10:00 AM in
COURTROOM 1 with Judge ANDERSON.
ilas
FLD:HABEAS CORPUS
ilas
FLD: RELEASE WITH NOTICE TO APPEAR WITH INMATE RELEASE FORM
ilas
FLD: AMENDED INFORMATION
ilas
Charge 53-3-203 Sev MC was amended to 53-3-227 Sev MC
ilas
Fel Arraignment
JUDGE: LYLE R. ANDERSON
ilas
Judge ANDERSON assigned.
ilas
TAPE: 94-108
COUNT:
1045
ilas
ATD: Deft pro se
PRO: HALLS, CRAIG C.
ilas
Deft is present and pro se
ilas
Deft advised of rights
ilas
Information was read in court
ilas
PRE
scheduled for 12/01/94 at 0130 P in room A with LRAilas
Bail Amount ordered:
7000.00
ilas
THE DEFENDANT WAS GIVEN A COPY OF THE INFORMATION. THE NATURE ilas
OF THE CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS AS PRESCRIBED BY LAW WERE EXPLAIN-ilas
ED. THE DEFENDANT STATED THAT HE UNDERSTANDS THE THINGS THE
ilas
COURT EXPLAINED. THE COURT EXPLAINED THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHTS TO ilas
AN ATTORNEY AND THE DEFENDANT STATED THAT HE CHOOSES TO
ilas
REPRESENT HIMSELF. THE DEFENDANT DEMANDED A PRELIMINARY HEARINGilas
AND IT WAS SET FOR DECEMBER 1, 1994 AT 1:30 P.M. THE DEFENDANT ilas
STATED THAT HE DOES NOT TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE, THAT HE DAMANDS
ilas
ALL HIS CONSTITUTIONAL AND COMMON LAW RIGHTS AND THAT HE WANTS ilas
TO BE INDITED BY A GRAND JURY AND NOT BY FILING OF INFORMATION, ilas
THE COURT AUTHORIZED THE FILING OF THE DEFENDANTS DECLARATION OFilas
INDEPENDANCE.
ilas
FLD: PUBLICATION OF DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE
ilas
FLD: ORDER WITH CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
bis
FLD: TRANSCRIPT OR TAPE ORDER
ilas
UPDATE: MAILED ORDER FOR TAPE WITH MO FOR $10.00 TO PRICE
ilas
FLD: SUBPOENA WITH CERTIFICATE OF MAILING - DAVID E. CASTLE
bis
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Case No: 941700250
Date:
Mar. 13, 1997
11-30-94 Preliminary Hearing scheduled on December 01, 1994 at 01:32 PM
in COURTROOM 1 with Judge ANDERSON.
ilas
12-01-94 MISCELLEANEOUS FEE
Payment Received:
8.00
bis
Note: TAPE DUPLICATION FEE
12-01-94 Judge ANDERSON assigned.
bis
12-01-94 Hearing (PRELIMINARY HEARING):
JUDGE: LYLE R. ANDERSON
ilas
12-01-94
TAPE: 94-120
COUNT:
6560
ilas
12-01-94
ATD: Deft pro se
PRO: HALLS, CRAIG C.
ilas
12-01-94
Deft Present and pro se
ilas
12-01-94
OSC
scheduled for 12/15/94 at 1000 A in room A with LRAilas
12-01-94 THE STATE'S WITNESS WAS NOT PRESENT. THE COURT ORDERED THE
ilas
12-01-94 CLERK TO PREPARE AN ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE FOR DECEMBER 15, 1995 ASilas
12-01-94 TO WHY THE WITNESS SHOULD NOT BE HELD IN CONTEMPT OF COURT FOR ilas
12-01-94 FAILURE TO OBEY A SUBPOENA. THE DEFENDANT MADE A MOTION TO
ilas
12-01-94 DISMISS. THE STATE MADE A MOTION TO POSTPONE THE HEARING AND A ilas
12-01-94 MOTION TO PAY THE DEFENDANT FOR HIS TRAVEL EXPENSES. THE MOTION ilas
12-01-94 TO DISMISS WAY DENIED AND THE MOTIONS TO POSTPONE AND PAY TRAVELilas
12-01-94 EXPENSES WERE GRANTED. THE ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WAS SET FOR
ilas
12-01-94 DECEMBER 15, 1994 AT 10:00 A.M. AND THE PRELIMINARY HEARING WAS ilas
12-01-94 SET FOR FEBRUARY 16, 1995 AT 1:35 P.M. THE DEFENDANT MADE A
ilas
12-01-94 MOTION CHALLENGING THE COURTS JURISDICTION AND THE COURT ADVISEDilas
12-01-94 THE DEFENDANT TO MAKE THE MOTION IN WRITING AND TO SUBMIT A
ilas
12-01-94 MOTION FOR TRAVEL EXPENSES IN WRITING ALSO. (CONTINUED ON
ilas
12-01-94 94-121/01)
ilas
12-01-94 FLD: MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE WITH CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
ilas
12-01-94 FLD: REQUEST FOR TAPE DUPLICATION
bis
12-05-94 UPDATE: GAVE DOUG HALL OSC TO SO FOR SERVICE
ilas
12-05-94 FLD: SHERIFF'S RETURN OF SERVICE WITH ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE/DOUG ilas
12-05-94
HALLS
ilas
12-05-94 Order to Show Cause scheduled on Decembei n>, IMVM at lu:u0 AM
in COURTROOM 1 with Judge ANDERSON.
ilas
12-15-94 Judge ANDERSON assigned.
ilas
12-15-94 Hearing (ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE):
JUDGfc". LYLE R. ANUERUON
bis
12-15-94
TAPE: 94-130
COUNT:
777
bis
12-15-94
ATD: None Present
PRO: HALLS, CRAIG c
bis
12-15-94
Deft not present
bis
12-15-94 THE CASE WAS BEFORE THE COURT FOR AN ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE FOR
bis
12-15-94 SARGENT DOUG HALL. SARGENT HALL WAS PRESENT AND THE COURT FINDS bis
12-15-94 THAT HE IS NOT IN CONTEMPT BUT THAT HE MAY BE HELD RESPONSIBLE bis
12-15-94 FOR ALL OR SOME OF THE COSTS OF THE DEFENDANT'S TRAVEL EXPENSES.bis
01-04-95 Preliminary Hearing scheduled on February 16, 1995 at 01:35 PM
in COURTROOM 1 with Judge ANDERSON.
ilas
01-12-95 FLD: NOTICE OF RELATED CASE/MOTION TO COMBINE WITH CERTIFICATE bis
01-12-95
OF MAILING
bis
02-06-95 FLD: MOTION FOR DISCOVERY
bis
02-06-95 FLD: MOTION TO DISMISS COUNT 5: DRIVING ON SUSPENSION
bis
02-06-95 FLD: SUBPOENA WITH CERTIFICATE OF MAILING - DOUG HALL
bis
02-06-95 FLD: ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY WITH CERTIFICATE OF MAILINGbls
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Case No: 941700250
Date:
Mar. 13, 1997
02-06-95
02-16-95
02-16-95
02-16-95
02-16-95
02-16-95
02-16-95
02-16-95
02-16-95
02-16-95
02-16-95
02-16-95
02-16-95
02-16-95
02-16-95
02-16-95
02-16-95
02-16-95
02-16-95
02-16-95
02-16-95
02-16-95
02-16-95
02-16-95
02-16-95
02-16-95
02-16-95
02-16-95
02-16-95
02-17-95
02-21-95
03-02-95
03-10-95
03-10-95
03-13-95
03-13-95
03-15-95
03-23-95
03-23-95
04-03-95
04-04-95
04-06-95
04-06-95
04-06-95
04-06-95

FLD: RULING ON MOTION FOR DISCOVERY WITH CERTIFICATE OF MAILING bis
FLD: AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID CASTLE
ilas
FLD: AFFIDAVID OF PAULA CASTLE
ilas
Hearing (PRELIMINARY HEARING):
JUDGE: LYLE R. ANDERSON
bis
Judge ANDERSON assigned.
bis
TAPE: 95-30
COUNT:
1345
bis
ATD: Deft pro se
PRO: HALLS, CRAIG C.
bis
Deft Present and pro se
bis
THE COURT ANSWERS QUESTIONS FORM DEFENDANT. THE STATE CALLS
bis
SARGENT DOUG HALL WHO WAS SWORN ANDT TESTIFIED. THE STATE CALLS bis
OFFICER BILL PIERCE WHO WAS SWORN AND TESTIFIED. THE STATE
bis
RESTS. THE DEFENDANT WISHES TO TESTIFY IN HIS BEHALF. THE DEbis
FENDANT WAS SWORN AND TESTIFIED (CONTINUED 95-31/01). THE
bis
DEFENSE RESTS. THE STATE GIVES CLOSING ARGUMENTS. THE DEFENDANT bis
GIVES CLOSING ARGUMENTS. THE COURT FINDS PROBABLE CAUSE THAT THEbls
DEFENDANT HAS COMMITTED THE CRIMES AS CHARGED IN THE INFORMATIONbls
AND ORDERS HIM BOUND OVER TO ANSWER THE CHARGES IN DISTRICT
bis
COURT. THE DEFENDANT AGREED TO HAVE HIS ARRAIGNMENT IN DISTRICT bis
COURT NOW. THE DEFENDANT PLEAD NOT GUILTY AND THE COURT ORDERED bis
THE PLEAS ENTERED. THE COURT SET THE JURY TRIAL FOR APRIL 3 AND bis
4, 1995, AT 9:30 AM.
bis
Chrg: 41-6-13.5 Plea: Not Guilty
ilas
Chrg: 41-6-46 Plea: Not Guilty
ilas
Chrg: 76-8-3 05 Plea: Not Guilty
ilas
Chrg: 76-8-309 Plea: Not Guilty
ilas
Chrg: 53-3-227 Plea: Not Guilty
ilas
Chrg: 76-10-504 Plea: Not Guilty
ilas
FLD: JUDICIAL NOTICE DEMAND FOR RIGHTS WITH ATTATCHMENT
ilas
FLD: ORDER
ilas
FLD: PRELIMINARY HEARING LOG SHEET
bis
FLD: RETRACTION OF PLEADING
ilas
FLD: JUDICIAL NOTICE/DEMAND FOR RIGHTS
bis
UPDATE: DEFENDANT CALLED AND SAID THAT HE WANTED COPIES OF THE bis
TAPES OF THE PRELIMINARY HEARING. HE IS SENDING $8.00. bis
MISCELLEANEOUS FEE
Payment Received:
8.00
sbm
Note: RECEIVED THROUGH MAIL
MISCELLEANEOUS FEE
Payment Received:
8.00
sbm
Note: RECEIVED THROUGH MAIL
FLD: MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE
ilas
FLD: RULING ON MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE W/ CERTIFICATE OF MAILING shell]
TBD scheduled on April 06, 1995 at 10:00 AM in COURTROOM 1 with
Judge ANDERSON.
shell]
FLD: MOTION TO CHANGE ORDER WITH CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
ilas
FLD: RESPONSE TO CHANGE ORDER WITH CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
ilas
Hearing:
JUDGE: LYLE R. ANDERSON
bis
Judge ANDERSON assigned.
bis
TAPE: 95-38
COUNT:
1680
bis
ATD: None Present
PRO: HALLS, CRAIG C.
bis
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Case No: 941700250
Date:
Mar. 13, 1997
0 4 - 0 6 -95
0 4 - 0 6 -95
0 4 - 0 6 -95
0 4 - 0 6 -95
0 4 - 0 6 -95
0 4 - 0 6 -95
0 4 - 2 0 -95
0 4 - 2 0 -95

Deft not present
bis
HRG
scheduled for 04/20/95 at 1000 A in room A with LRAbls
THE DEFENDANT WAS NOT PRESENT AND THE COURT NOTED FOR THE RECORDbls
THAT THE DEFENDANT HAS CALLED AND THE MATTER WAS CONTINUED TO
bis
APRIL 20, 1995, AT 10:00 AM. THE DEFENDANT WILL APPEAR WITH HIS bis
ATTORNEY AT THAT TIME.
bis
FLD: RETURN OF SERVICE WITH SUBPOENA/CRAIG HALLS
bis
HEARING scheduled on April 20, 1995 at 10:00 AM in COURTROOM 1
convert
with Judge ANDERSON.
0 4 - 2 0 •95 Judge ANDERSON assigned.
convert
0 4 - 2 0 •95 Hearing:
bis
JUDGE: LYLE R. ANDERSON
0 4 - 2 0 -95
bis
TAPE: 95-41
COUNT:
24 69
PRO: HALLS, CRAIG C.
0 4 - 2 0 •95
bis
ATD: Deft pro se
0 4 - 2 0 •95
bis
Deft Present and pro se
0 4 - 2 0 •95 THE DEFENDANT WAS PRESENT WITH COUNSEL THAT IS NOT LICENSED IN bis
0 4 - 2 0 •95 THE STATE OF UTAH, AND THE COURT DISMISSED COUNSEL. THE STATE
bis
0 4 - 2 0 •95 MOVED TO QUASH THE SUBPOENA ISSUED BY DEFENDANT, AND THE DEFEND-bls
0 4 - 2 0 •95 ANT OBJECTED. THE COURT GRANTED THE MOTION BY THE STATE. THE
bis
0 4 - 2 0 •95 COURT PASSED THE MATTER TO GIVE DEFEDANT TIME TO DECIDE IF HE
bis
0 4 - 2 0 •95 WILL HIRE AN ATTORNEY LICENSED IN THE STATE OF UTAH. RECALLED
bis
0 4 - 2 0 •95 95-41/4264 THE DEFENDANT CHOOSES NOT TO HIRE AN ATTORNEY LICEN- bis
0 4 - 2 0 •95 SED IN THE STATE OF UTAH AND REFUSES COURT APPOINTED COUNSEL ANDbls
0 4 - 2 0 •95 ALSO REFUSES AN ATTORNEY TO BE APPOINTED TO STAND BY. THE COURT bis
0 4 - 2 0 •95 SET THE JURY TRIAL FOR JULY 17 & 18, 1995, AT 9:30 AM. THE
bis
0 4 - 2 0 •95 COURT INSTRUCTED THE PARTIES TO SUBMIT JURY INSTRUCTIONS SEVEN bis
0 4 - 2 0 -95 DAYS PRIOR TO THE TRIAL AND IF DEFENDANT DECIDES TO HIRE COUNSELbls
0 4 - 2 0 95 AN APPEARANCE NEEDS TO BE ENTERED 30 DAYS PRIOR TO THE TRIAL.
bis
0 4 - 2 0 95 THE COURT ALSO INSTRUCTED THE DEFENDANT THAT IF HE DECIDES TO
bis
0 4 - 2 0 95 HAVE STAND BY COUNSEL APPOINTED HE NEEDS TO INFORM THE COURT 2 bis
0 4 - 2 0 95 WEEKS PRIOR TO THE TRIAL AND IF THERE ARE QUESTIONS THE DEFEND- bis
0 4 - 2 0 95 ANT WANTS ASKED TO THE JURY HE SHALL SUBMIT THOSES QUESTION ONE bis
0 4 - 2 0 95 WEEK PRIOR TO THE TRIAL.
bis
0 4 - 2 0 -95 Jury Trial scheduled on July 17, 1995 at 09:30 AM in COURTROOM 1L
with Judge ANDERSON.
bis
04-20 -95 Jury Trial scheduled on July 18, 1995 at 09:30 AM
-OURTROOM 1
bis
with Judge ANDERSON.
sbm
04-27 -95 MISCELLEANEOUS FEE
8.00
Payment Received:
Note: TAPE COPY FEE
ilas
0 6 - 0 7 -95 FLD: NOTICE OF REQUEST FOR TRANSCRIPTION OF A PORTION OF THE
ilas
0 6 - 0 7 -95
PROCEEDINGS
bis
0 6 - 1 2 -95 FLD: ORDER FOR TRANSCRIPT
0 6 - 2 0 -95 FLD: STATE OF UTAH, PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS WITH CERTIFICATE ilas
0 6 - 2 0 •95
OF MAILING
ilas
0 6 - 2 6 •95 FLD: AMENDED NOTICE OF REQUEST FOR TRANSCRIPTION OF A PORTION OFbls
0 6 - 2 6 •95
THE PROCEEDINGS
bis
0 6 - 2 8 -95 FLD: AMENDED ORDER FOR TRANSCRIPT
ilas
0 7 - 0 3 -95 FLD: LIST OF JURORS SUMMONED FOR JURY DUTY
bis
0 7 - 0 3 -95 FLD: NOTICE TO ALL JURORS SERVING
bis
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ADDENDUM VII
EXCERPTS OF TRIAL TRANSCRIPT
(R.359-363)

120

THE COURT:

]

The opinion

2

inaudible) is i r r e l e v a n t .

3

ustained.

-I

t hinks

MR, CASTLE:

8

THE C O U R T :

I'm

17

like to approach

Can

any

Jury.
—

I come up to the

s 1: a n d ?
THE COURT:
present

him something

You may approach him

MR. C A S T L E :
Q.

I would

(BY MR. CASTLE:)

like

--

gun?

A.

To have the gun concealed

19

Q.

Concealed

20

A.

• - or in an a u t o m o b i l e .

21

Q.

on your person

- -

on --

-- my person?

22

something

23

you read t h i s , 7 6 - 1 0 - 5 0 4 .

Okay.

here from the Criminal

MR. H A L L S :

Let me have you

read

Code of Utah.

Would

Your Honor, we can

judicial notice of the criminal

MILLER-LANE

(inaudible)

Your opinion was that I

didn't have a right to have the

24

and

—

1 8

25

the w i t n e s s .

Mr. C a s t l e , do not make

MR. C A S T L E :

15
18

We a 1 1 1 : i

directing you and instructing you not to make

13
14

of cours e i l o t,

further side comments to the Members of the

11
12

Cas 11e

that.
I would

10

is

(inaudible) - -

7

9

The objection

11 doesi I ' t matter

5
6

about

COURT REPORTING,

statute

INC.

take

that's

(505)

325-1939

1 I relevant.

I'm

not sure this officer reading a

2 I statute in court is going to do anything.
3

it's

—

4

THE C O U R T :

5

instruct

6

defendant

7

instructions

has the opportunity

MR. C A S T L E :

11

MR. C A S T L E :

12

THE COURT:

13

not ask this question

14

matter

for jury

15

20

I've

MR. CASTLE:
like —

25 | read,

please?

MILLER-LANE

may

seen them and they
—

You have the right

to

do

This point is very
of o p i n i o n .

Mr. Castle, do not

I have sustained

24 | would

That's a

This statute

to our difference

23 |

--

jury instruction, Mr. Castle.

THE COURT:

22 | with m e .

—

of the w i t n e s s .

MR. CASTLE:

21 J

request

instructions.

a proper

pertinent

the

-- I have ruled that you may

MR. C A S T L E :

19

to

-- a gun.

not have this statute in them.

17

to

Mr. Castle

MR. C A S T L E :

propose

going

I object because there's a

law here that says I can have
THE C O U R T :

18

I'm

--

10

16

That's right.

the jury about what the law i s , and

8
9

I think

the
I'd

objection.
like to show you what I

I show you what

COURT REPORTING,

argue

I would

INC.

(505)

like him to
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1 |

Okay.

T h i s , except t h i s , and

2 !

THE C O U R T :
lefendant has proffered

4

7 6 - 1 0 - 5 0 4 , Subsection

5

The record will note
a reading of

Section

W e l l , but wait.

THE COURT:

8

MR. C A S T L E : ( i n a u d i b l e ) .

9

THE C O U R T :

10 I

MR. C A S T L E :

1J I

THE C O U R T :

A n d S u b s e c t i o n ] a n :I 1 ( a ) .

And 7 6 - 1 0 - ( i n a u d i b l e ) .
That's the -You made your

MR. C A S T L E :
"Position of Weapon

15
16

discussion

17

the c h a r g e , I will

18

it.

This is literally

entitled

Authorized."

THE C O U R T :

Mr. Castle, no

of those s e c t i o n s .
instruct

further

If they're

relevant

the jury with regard

to

to

We're not going to argue ( i n a u d i b l e ) .

19

MR. C A S T L E :

Is the law relevant

says I can't have a gun in my car

21

THE COURT:

22 J

MR. C A S T L E :

23 |

THE C O U R T :

24 | these

record,

Castle.

13 I

20

Wait,

Okay.

/ i

Mr

the

1.

MR, C A S T L E :
wait, wait.

then

concealed?

Mr. Castle
Am

that

--

I being charged with

--

-- no further discussion

of

statutes.

25 I

MR. C A S T L E :

MILLER-LANE

I'm
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being charged with

INC.
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this
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1 | very t h i n g , and it says right here I -2 I

THE COURT:

3

contempt

4

before

of court.

I sentence

5
6

M r . C a s t l e , I find you

Do you have anything to say
you?

MR. C A S T L E :
contempt

of court

7

I demand

8

entitled

9

sentence you to thirty

All

right.

days in

I

Members of the Jury, because this

12

case.

13

effort here is wasted. Mr. Castle

I'm

I'm

forced

reluctant

14

to declare

a mistrial

to do that because

MR. C A S T L E :

has

in this

it means

your

is not --

Your Honor, you're the

one

that's in contempt of court.

16

THE C O U R T :
the

You're

excused, Members

of

Jury.

18

Bailiff, take the defendant

19

custody.

20

at

Set his arrangement

10 o'clock

21

into

for Thursday, the

20th,

a. m.
THE B A I L I F F :

22 I courtroom,

Would you step out of the

please.

23 I
24 I

not

jail.

happened,

17

You are

to a jury trial with that charge.

11

15

a jury trial on a

charge.

THE C O U R T :

10

in

MR. C A S T L E :

I move for a stay of

execution.

25 |

THE COURT:

MILLER-LANE

Denied.
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I'm

sorry, M r . H a l l s .

Would you escort the defendant

in

rustody, M r . Bailiff.
Declare a mistrial

in this case.

Bring him before the Court on the
or a rescheduling

20th

of the t r i a l .

(Court adjourned

at 2:03

p.m.)
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ADDENDUM VIII
RELEASE ORDER (R.169)

SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT
San Juan County
FILED AUG - 4 1995
CLERK OF THE COURT
BV
BEPDT7~

Tn The Seventh Judicial District Court Of San Juan County
State of Utah

Till: STATE OF UTAH,

ORDER
Plaintiff,

Case No. 9417-250 FS

DAVID ELLIOTT CASTLE,
Defendant.

Defendant was committed to the San Juan County Jail on J
17

JL'j'ib, I. serve .. iM *iiy sentence for contempt of court

August !.„ 1995, defendant will have sex veil i.w*

*

uub

sentence.
Defendant has filed a statement with the court committing to
be respectful and apologizing

for his at MeRs

^n

MM

^ourt.

Defendant also pledged to abide by all lawful orders of the court.
While this pledge from the defendant falls short of what the law
requires

:I e , compliance with all orders of the rourt that are

not patently invalid —

it represents some progress which the court

desires to encourage.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the last ten day? .. i defends
sentence be suspended, on the condition that defendant obey orders of the court

uid demonstrate respect for the authority of
1

the court during all future proceedings. In particular, defendant
is directed and ordered as follows:
1.

Not to use his opening statement for any purpose other

than to outline to the jury what defendant expects the evidence to
show.
2.

Not to make comments to jurors or members of the jury

during the trial except during opening statements and closing
arguments.
3.

To accept without argument the rulings of the court on

the admissibility of the evidence.

If defendant wishes to make a

proffer or to offer more argument, he is to request a conference
outside the hearing of the jury.
4.

Not to argue or suggest to the jurors that they are free

to, or should, disregard the court's statement of what the law is,
or determine that the law should be disregarded.
5.

Not to place material in locations accessible to jurors

which suggests or argues that the jury has the power to ignore the
law.
6.

To

address

all motions

contesting

the

validity

of

statutes under which defendant is charged, and any requests for
interpretation of the statutes, to the court.
7.

To address the prosecutor as Mr. Halls and the presiding

judge as Judge or "your honor."
8.

To request jury instructions that are respectful of the

authority of the court and represent a good faith effort to
interpret the statute under which defendant is charged and the
2

rules governing these proceedings.
DATED LJifci 411

Jay

ot

August,

1995.

Nt
ici^jM^(S\
D i s t r i c t Court Judge
Si^nrdluvP s W p laud

aj) \pxsi. ^uXx^pU»>nj

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify tiiat I fiaml delivered true diitl correct copies
the foregoing ORDER, to:
David Elliott Castle
San Juan County Jail Inmate
297 S. Main
Monticello, UT 84 535

Craig C. Halls
San Juan County Attorney
297 S. Main
Monticello, UT 84535
DATED the

* # ^ day "I 'UJ«)U,SI , i

3us ^€)ou^ik
Deputy Court Clerk

3

